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LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS FOR INJURIES
TO PASSENGERS RESULTING FROM DOMESTIC
HIJACKINGS AND RELATED INCIDENTS
BRAD KiZZA
I. INTRODUCTION*

During the late hours of January 24, 1980, a twenty-eight year
old Atlanta man successfully smuggled a .25 caliber handgun
aboard a Delta Air Lines Lockheed L-1011, when he, his wife
and two children boarded the aircraft at Hartsfield Airport in
Atlanta, Georgia.1 The Delta airliner was en route to New York
City from Los Angeles, California, with fifty-three passengers and
twelve crewmen when it was diverted to Havana, Cuba, on the
orders of the hijacker Four hours later the plane landed at Jose
Marti Airport in Havana. While the hijacker negotiated for eleven
hours in an attempt to secure another aircraft to fly to Tehran,
Iran, one passenger was overcome by the emotionally tense situation and was allowed to leave the plane.' For the remaining passengers, the ordeal ended when the hijacker surrendered to Cuban
authorities after the passengers managed to sneak off the aircraft
* Editor's Note: Since this comment went to print, there have occurred at
least five additional seizures of American airliners, bringing the number of such
events subsequent to January, 1973, to 50 and raising the 1980 U.S. skyjacking
figure to 15. Four of these five most recent hijackings resulted in successful
diversions of American jetliners to Cuba. Four out of five involved seizures of
domestic flights. All apparently were perpetrated by homesick Cubans who
threatened to ignite flammable liquids which they claimed to have smuggled on
board the aircrafts.
Dallas Morning News, Jan. 26, 1980, at I, col 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 27,
199'0, at 18, col. 5. Federal Aviation Administration officials subsequently stated
that security mechanisms used at the airport were operating satisfactorily at
the time of the hijacking. The hijacker apparently also claimed to have a bomb,
but he did not. Dallas Morning News, Jan. 26, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
2 Dallas Morning News, Jan. 26, 1980, at 1, col. 1. A nonscheduled diversion of a domestic flight outside the United States or to another country does
not invoke the jurisdiction of the Warsaw Convention for international flights.
See notes 21, 25, infra.
3 Dallas Morning News, Jan. 26, 1980, at 1, col. 1. The passenger suffered
what was described as a "nervous convulsion." Id. at 14, col. 6.
4
In 1973 the United States and Cuba entered into an agreement whereby
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through a food service elevator while the hijacker was in the cockpit
and his family was asleep! The passengers finally reached their
New York destination at 10:30 p.m. on January 25.!
The January 24 hijacking of a Delta airliner was the first attempted hijacking' of an American air carrier8 in 1980 While
hijacked aircraft (or vessels) and passengers would be returned to the country
of origin and the hijackers would either be prosecuted or returned. See Memorandum of Understanding on Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and other
Offenses: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (Feb. 20, 1973).
The agreement was allowed to lapse on April 15, 1977, after Cuban President
Castro accused the United States, and particularly the C.I.A., of sabotaging a
Cuban airliner that crashed in the Barbados in 1976. However, Castro indicated that Cuba would unilaterally abide by the basic provisions of the
agreement. See New York Times, June 12, 1979, at 13, col. 5.
' Dallas Morning News, Jan. 26, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
" Id. The flight had been delayed more than eighteen hours.
"Hijacking" has been defined as "the unlawful seizure and diversion of aircraft to unscheduled destinations." United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 511
(5th Cir. 1973). For purposes of this comment, "skyjacking" and "hijacking"
will be considered synonymous and will be used interchangeably. The same will
apply to "skyjacker" and "hijacker." For purposes of criminal prosecution, "air
piracy" is defined as a "seizure of control, by force or violence or threats of
force or violence, or by any other form of intimidation" of an aircraft. 49
U.S.C. S 1472(i)(2) (1976).
SThis includes commercial operators engaging in intrastate common carriage
covered by the Code of Federal Regulations Title 14, Part 121.7, 14 C.F.R. S
121.7 (1980). A common carrier holds its services out to the general public to
carry for hire at a uniform rate all persons who apply, so long as there is room
on board. See Jackson v. Stancil, 116 S.E.2d 817 (N.C. Sup. 1960). A private
carrier does not offer its services to the general public and reserves the right to
refuse carriage to anyone. See Slezr v. Lang, 102 N.W.2d 435 (Neb. Sup. 1960).
See also M. MCCLINTOCK, AIRCRAFT HIJACKING: ITS CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
RAMIFICATIONS 65 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as McCLNTOCK]; McClintock,
Skyjacking: Its Domestic Civil and Criminal Ramifications, 39 J. AIR L. & COM.
29, 42-43 nn. 56-57 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Skyjacking].
I Three days earlier on January 21, 1980, an extortionist, who had previously
left a fake bomb aboard a United Airlines DC-8, phoned United headquarters
in Los Angeles demanding money and claiming that the bomb would detonate
if the aircraft dropped to an altitude below 5,000 feet. The airliner was diverted
to Colorado Springs Municipal Airport in Colorado because, at 6,172 feet, it is
the highest airport in the United States at which a DC-8 can land. A box of
simulated dynamite was discovered aboard. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1980, at 12,
col. 1. Since the January 24, 1980 hijacking of the Delta jetliner, there have
been at least nine other seizures of American commercial airliners by hijackers,
eight of which involved domestic flights. See Miami Herald, Aug. 17, 1980,
at 1, col. 5 (reporting 3 hijackings which occurred on August 16, 1980); N.Y.
Times, Aug. 15, 1980, at 12, col. 5; Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 1980, at 5, col. 1;
Wash. Post, Aug. 11, 1980, at 11, col. 5; Wash. Post, July 13, 1980, at 6, col.
2; Wash. Post, May 3, 1980, at 6, col. 3; Wash. Post, April 10, 1980, at 11,
col. 3 (each article reporting a hijacking that occurred on the day prior to the
article).
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it was only the second successful hijacking of a U.S. airliner to
Cuba since 1972, it constituted the fifth successful hijacking" of
an American air carrier during the same period."' Furthermore, the

"0 N.Y. Times, June 12, 1979, at 1, col. 1. On June 11, 1979, a former Cuban
Air Force pilot, who had ten years earlier been granted political asylum when
he defected to the United States by piloting a Soviet-made MIG-17 jet to
Florida, succeeded in hijacking a Delta Airlines Lockheed L-1011 Tristar jumbo
jet (en route from New York to Ft. Lauderdale, Florida) to Havana, Cuba.
The act constituted the first effective hijacking of an American airliner to Cuba
since 1972, and it was accomplished when the hijacker forced his way into the
cockpit, claiming to possess a bomb and demanding transport to Havana. The
bomb threat proved false and the hijacker was taken into custody by Cuban
authorities. Id.; see also N.Y. Times, June 13, 1979, at 22, col. 3; N.Y. Times,
June 13, 1979, at 23, col. 3. From 1968 through July 1971 seventy-five percent
of all attempted hijackings of American aircraft were intended for Cuba. J.
AREY, THE SKY PIRATES 320-24 (1972) [hereinafter cited as AREY]. Since the
January, 1980 hijacking of the Delta airliner to Cuba, there have been at least
eight additional hijackings of U.S. jetliners to Cuba. See Miami Herald, Aug. 17,
1980, at 1, col. 5 (reporting 3 hijackings to Cuba that occurred on August 16,
1980); N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1980, at 12, col. 5; Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 1980,
at 5, col. 1; Wash. Post, Aug. 11, 1980, at 11, col. 5; Wash. Post, July 23, 1980,
at 6, col. 2; Wash. Post, April 10, 1980, at 11, col. 3 (each article reporting a
hijacking of a U.S. airliner to Cuba).
11According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), a "successful"
hijacking is one in which the perpetrator forces an American aircraft to make an
unscheduled landing in another country. See Department of Transportation,
Federal Aviation Administration, Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program, January 1-June 30, 1979 (1979),
submitted pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976), as
amended Pub. L. No. 93-366 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as 1979 FAA Report]. When making reference to a "successful" hijacking, this comment utilizes
the FAA definition of such incidents. However, whether or not a skyjacker
diverts an aircraft to a non-scheduled stop in a foreign country is not determinative of the air carrier's liability for injuries that may have been incurred by
its passengers.
"In addition to the ten previously mentioned successful hijackings of U.S.
airliners to Cuba (see notes 1-6, 10, supra, and accompanying text), there have
been a minimum of 3 other "successful" skyjackings involving American air
carriers since 1972. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1979, IV, at 20, col. 6; N.Y. Times,
June 22, 1979, at 3, col. 3 (reporting two successful hijackings to Cuba that
occurred in 1979 in addition to the June 11, 1979 hijacking cited in note 10
supra). Prior to the three successful 1979 hijackings and the nine successful
1980 hijackings, the last successful act of air piracy perpetrated against an
American airliner, and the only successful skyjacking since 1972 that did not
involve a diversion to Cuba, occurred on September 10, 1976, when five
Croatian nationalists faked possession of explosives and succeeded in hijacking
to Paris, France, a Trans World Airlines Chicago-to-New York flight. Eightyfive passengers and seven crewmen were held for 32 hours and threatened with
death. See United States v. Busic, 592 F.2d 13, 16-19 (2d Cir. 1978). See also
N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1976, at 1, col. 5. Although eight successful skyjackings
occurred in 1972, no successful hijackings of United States air carriers occurred
in 1973, 1974 or 1975. 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 20 (Exhibit 1).
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January 24 Delta hijacking marked the thirty-sixth time that a

hijacking has been attempted on board an American airliner since
the U.S. Civil Aviation Security Program was fully implemented
in January, 1973.1" Yet, the most significant aspect of this first

hijacking of 1980 was the fact that it was the only hijacking of a
U.S. carrier since prior to January, 1973 that involved a real firearm or highly explosive device passing undetected through the pre-

boarding screening system.1'
The liability of air carriers for injuries to passengers on international flights to, from, or stopping over in the United States is

governed by the Warsaw Convention"1 as modified by the so-called
Montreal Agreement." The Warsaw Convention contains specific
3
See 1979 Report, supra note 11, at 20 (Exhibit 1). According to that report the FAA had recorded 31 such attempted hijackings of United States air
carriers between January 1, 1973, and July 1, 1979. Since the report was written,
at least 14 more hijackings have been tried in which American airliners have
been involved, ten of which have occurred in 1980 and have previously been
mentioned. See note 9 supra; see also, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1979, at 17, col.
1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1979, IV, at 20, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1979,
at 12, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1979, at 11, col. 1 (reporting 4 other hijacking attempts aboard U.S. domestic airliners since July 1, 1979). The 45 recorded
hijacking attempts perpetrated against United States air carriers since January,
1973, do not include incidents in which persons who may have intended to
attempt hijackings were prevented from doing so by detection of weapons or
explosives in the preboarding screening procedures. Only those incidents where
the would be skyjacker manages to board the aircraft are categorized as attempted hijackings. See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 4.
14See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 1; see also note 1 supra. While it
remains a fact that no other hijacking of a U.S. airliner since January, 1973,
has involved the use of an actual firearm or bomb that was smuggled through
airline screening mechanisms, since the January, 1980, Delta hijacking, Cuban
refugees in the United States have managed to hijack four U.S. jetliners to Cuba
by threatening to ignite gasoline that was carried aboard the planes undetected.
See Miami Herald, Aug. 17, 1980, at 1, col. 5 (reporting two such incidents);
N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1980, at 12, col. 5; Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 1980, at 5, col. 1.
1 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976). The Warsaw Convention is officially entitled
"Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air," opened for signature October 12, 1929, declaration of
adherence by the United States deposited at Warsaw, Poland, July 31, 1934, proclaimed October 29, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000-26 T.S. 876 (1934) [hereinafter cited as
Warsaw]. The Convention creates both a presumption of liability on the part of
the carrier for injury or death arising out of international transportation (subject to certain defenses) and a concomitant limitation of liability (subject to
certain exceptions) to 125,000 Poincare francs (about $8,300) per passenger.
See Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 589 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1978).
18On May 14, 1966, the United States announced the approval by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, Dept. of State Press Release Nos. 110, 111, 54 Dept. State
Bull. 955 (1966), of the arrangement, known as Agreement CAB 18900, which
provides, inter alia, that the parties thereto agree to include in their tariffs to
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articles which attempt to regulate liability of international air carriers in a uniform manner by establishing a presumption of liability," by limiting liability, 8 and by establishing defenses against
liability." The Montreal Agreement, which became effective on

May 16, 1966, provided two major modifications to the Warsaw
scheme of air carrier liability by raising the carrier's limitation
of liability for the death, wounding or other bodily injury of a
passenger and by imposing a system of absolute liability." While

hijackings of international ffights ' have given rise to a number of
lawsuits by passengers to recover damages for injuries suffered, 2
be filed with the CAB a "special contract" by which the carrier would waive its
defense of due care provided by Article 20(1) of the Convention and also raise
its limitation of liability under the Convention to $75,000. See 31 Fed. Reg. 7,302
(1966); See also Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976); Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 427 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Together, the Agreement (signed by each airline), the requisite tariff, filed
pursuant to the Agreement on May 16, 1966, the Notice to Passengers included
within the ticket informing the passenger of the change in the regime of the
Warsaw Convention (and of its applicability), and the CAB order, constitute
what has been called the "Montreal Agreement." 1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION
ACCIDENT LAW, §§ 12A.01-12A.07 (1978). The Montreal system has not
changed the text of the Warsaw Convention, but rather "impose[s] upon international aviation involving the United States a . . . system of liability that is
essentially contractual in nature." Id. at § 12A.01. See generally, Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REv.
497 (1967). Hereinafter, the Warsaw Convention as modified by the Montreal
Agreement will be referred to as the "Warsaw System."
"'See Warsaw, supra note 15, at arts. 17, 18, 19.
"Id. at arts. 22, 24.
"Id. at arts. 20, 21.
20 Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1154-55 (D.N.M.
1973); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 706 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), afl'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973); see note 16 supra.
"IInternational transportation is "any transportation in which according to
the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the transportation . . . are situated
• . . within the territories of two High Contracting Parties . . ." to the Warsaw

Convention. Warsaw, supra note 15, at art. 1(2). The Warsaw Convention applies
to "all international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by
aircraft for hire." Warsaw, supra note 15, at art. 1(1).
A domestic flight of an American carrier is one that is scheduled to begin
and end in the United States. FAA statistics normally do not distinguish domestic
and international flights because screening procedures and security measures
mandated by the FAA do not differentiate between domestic and international
flights. See generally 1979 FAA Report, note 11 supra.
"Under the Warsaw system, a "hijacking" is within the term "accident"
as used in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, and is sufficient to raise the
presumption of liability under Article 17. Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale
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only one hijacking of an American domestic flight has resulted in a
reported court decision 23 despite the fact that the majority of hijackings involving American carriers, at least during the last two
years, have occurred on domestic flights. "
This comment is concerned with the liability of an airline for
injuries to its passengers resulting from an incident of domestic
air hijacking (or related crime) like the above mentioned Delta
hijacking,' since the full screening of passengers and their carryAir France, 427 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Krystal v. British Overseas
Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Burnett v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport
Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 707-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), af§'d, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir.
1973); People ex rel Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Gilberto, 74 Ill. 2d
90, 383 N.E.2d 977 (I11. 1978); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34
N.Y.2d 385, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97, 314 N.E.2d 848 (1977).
" National Airlines, Inc. v. Edwards, 336 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1976). Cf. Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
which was brought in New York against the defendant airline to recover for
damages suffered by passengers during a hijacking on the common law theories
of negligence and false imprisonment. The court held that the subject flight was
in international transportation and subject to the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention. The case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because under the Warsaw Convention, New York was not one of the locations
that suit could be brought against Air France to recover for damages incurred
on the Tel Aviv-to-Paris flight. Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention provides in part that an action for damages must be instituted in a court "of the
domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has
a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the
court at the place of destination." Warsaw, supra note 17, at art. 28(1).
24Of the 28 hijacking incidents involving U.S. air carriers since January 1,
1978, 22 were hijackings of domestic flights. Seventeen out of the 20 such skyjackings since January 1, 1979, occurred on domestic flights. See 1979 FAA
Report, supra note 11, at 2-4; Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation
Administration, Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the
Civil Aviation Program, July 1-December 31, 1978 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
2d 1978 FAA Report] at 2-4; Department of Transportation, FAA Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Program,
January 1-June 30, 1978 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1st 1978 FAA Report]
at 7-8; see also notes 9 and 13 supra, and hijackings cited therein. Twelve of
the 13 successful skyjackings since January, 1973, involved domestic flights. See
notes 10 and 12 supra, and hijackings cited therein.
'The fact that a domestic flight is diverted out of the United States does
not make it an international flight.
Whether a particular flight is "international transportation" to which
the Convention applies is determined solely by reference to the "contract made by the parties" (Article 1(2)). If, according to the contract, the place of departure and place of destination are within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties, the Convention applies.
Whether a flight actually reaches its planned destination is
thus irrelevant. In choosing the contract as the basis for determining
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on items was instituted in 1973. Analysis is focused on current airline security measures, particularly the pre-boarding screening system, and the duty of air carriers to prevent weapons from penetrating that system. In addition, a portion of this article is devoted

to the issue of airline liability for mental or emotional injuries
suffered by passengers during skyjacking or related incidents on
domestic flights, as this will be a crucial issue to be resolved in
cases arising out of recent and future domestic airline hijackings.
II.

CURRENT AIRLINE SECURITY MEASURES

Present FAA regulations with regard to the pre-boarding passenger screening procedurese6 were promulgated pursuant to the
Air Transportation Security Act of 1974,"7 which directs the administrator of the FAA to prescribe "reasonable regulations requiring that all passengers and all property intended to be carried
in the aircraft cabin in air transportation . . . be screened by
weapon-detecting procedures or facilities employed or operated by
employees or agents of the air carrier... prior to boarding the aircraft for such transportation.""' Mandatory inspection of all pasthe application of the Convention, the drafters insured that events
beyond the control of the parties (crashes on takeoff, at sea, or
in non-signatory countries) would not deprive the carrier or the
passengers of uniform treatment under the Convention.
Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971, 977 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
"See 14 C.F.R. § 121.538(b) (1980), which requires all commercial common carriers to adopt and put into use a screening system, acceptable to the
FAA, that is "designed to prevent or deter the carriage aboard its aircraft of
any explosive or incendiary device or weapon in carry-on baggage or on or
about the persons of passengers . . . and the carriage of any explosive or incendiary device in checked baggage." Id.
The regulations do not describe the specific anti-hijacking procedures to be
followed. The air carriers have been informed through unpublished directives
what provisions would be "acceptable." See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893,
900 n.20 (9th Cir. 1973). Each carrier must file its own security program with the
FAA, and the Administrator has the authority to direct amendments to the
programs submitted for acceptance. 14 C.F.R. § 121.538(g)(1) (1980).
2749 U.S.C. 1356 (1976).
I1d. Approved airline security programs pursuant to the required preboarding passenger screening system have been implemented by 77 U.S. air
carriers and 91 foreign air carriers at 426 American and 270 foreign airports.
These air carriers operate more than 15,000 scheduled and chartered passenger
flights each day, and over 860,000 passengers with more than 1.3 million carryon items are screened daily. 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 21 (Exhibit 12).
The FAA is authorized to require foreign air carriers serving U.S. airports to
implement approved passenger screening systems. 49 U.S.C. § 1356 (1976).
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sengers and their carry-on items was instituted in January, 1973."
The security devices currently utilized at screening checkpoints
consist primarily of walk-through weapon detectors supplemented
by hand-held equipment for individual passengers, and x-ray inspection systems for carry-on items at high volume stations." While
an air carrier may be required to maintain a number of law enforcement officers adequate to support its security program," each
of whom must be armed and have completed a training program,'
the former rule requiring that the officers be permanently stationed
at screening stations has been relaxed so that in certain instances
the law enforcement officers supporting the passenger screening
system may patrol the public areas away from the screening checkpoint."
The effectiveness of the passenger screening system currently in
general use has been demonstrated by the fact that no hijacking
between January 1, 1973, and December 31, 1979, involved a real
1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 9.
o Id. The early security system consisted primarily of the use of a "hijacker
behavior profile," a magnetometer to deter the presence of metal or a
prospective passenger who meets the "profile," and a search of the carry-on
baggage and/or person of any such prospective passenger who activates the
magnetometer. The profile was formulated by the FAA with behavioral characteristics determined to be common to all hijackers in order to alert airline
personnel to potential hijackers. Those embarking passengers who were determined to match the behavioral profile ("selectees") were then subjected to an
electronic examination with the magnetometer. See generally McGinley and
Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41 FoRD. L.
REV. 293, 294-97 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as McGinley]; Abramovsky, Compensation for Passengers of Hijacked Aircraft, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 339, 340-41
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Abramovsky]; Blumenthal, Security Aloft: Screen
Below, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1978, S 10, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as
Blumenthal]; Mauer, Skyjacking and Airport Security, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 361,
367-69 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Mauer].
While the employment of armed "sky marshalls" to accompany planes with
the assignment of apprehending any would-be hijacker on board, was formerly
a major feature of the FAA mandated airline security program, Abramovsky,
supra at 341, they are no longer utilized on a widespread or routine basis.
1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 14. The primary reasons that this approach
to hijack prevention has been phased out are that better ground security measures have been developed and that the airlines have disfavored the use of armed
security personnel in flight. Blumenthal, supra.
31 American air carriers may only be required to provide security forces in
airports which are not required to do so, see 14 C.F.R. § 121.538(1) (1980), and
in areas of the air terminals in exclusive control of the airline. See 14 C.F.R. S
107.13(b) (1980).
s14 C.F.R. S 107.17(a)(3)-(4) (1980).
3 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 11.
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firearm or high explosive smuggled through a screening checkpoint."4 In fact, from January, 1973 to June 30, 1979, more than
18,000 firearms were detected by the security measures imple-

mented through the pre-flight passenger screening system resulting
in over 6,400 related arrests.'
III.

THE SKYJACKING THREAT SINCE JANUARY,

1973

In 1973, the first year of mandatory screening of all passengers
and their carry-on baggage, the number of attempted hijackings of
air carriers in the United States dropped to one from twenty-seven
in 1972."8 Furthermore, during the six-year period from January
1, 1973, through December 31, 1978, there were a total of twentyfive hijacking attempts perpetrated against U.S. carriers as contrasted with the twenty-seven hijacking attempts in 1972, the last
year prior to implementation of the 100 percent screening system."
14 1d. at 1. See note 14 supra, and accompanying text.

3Id. at 9. It is a violation of federal law for an unauthorized person to
attempt to board a commercial airliner while carrying a concealed weapon. 49
U.S.C. § 1472(1)(1) (1976). Passing through a screening device in the air

terminal prior to reaching the departure area constitutes an attempt to board
the aircraft within the proscription of the statute. United States v. Wilkinson,
389 F. Supp. 465, 467 (W.D. Pa.), af0'd, 521 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1975); United

States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Brown, 305 F.
Supp. 415, 417-18 (W.D. Tex. 1969); People v. Hysner, 58 Ill. App. 3d 464,
374 N.E.2d 799 (1978). No specific intent to carry the weapon onto the aircraft
or to use the weapon once aboard need be shown. People v. Hysner, 374 N.E.2d

at 801; United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Dishman, 486 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1973).
The fact that 6,400 arrests were made during the 6+-year period between
January, 1973 and June 30, 1979, does not necessarily indicate that that many
hijackings were thwarted by the pre-flight passenger screening system. The
FAA has determined that of these arrests, 79 were incidents in which it appeared
that persons intended to commit crimes against civil aviation but were prevented from doing so by the screening procedures. 1979 FAA Report, supra
note 11, at 4, 9. Of the firearms detected, approximately 85 percent were discovered through the x-ray inspection of carry-on items, 10 percent through the
screening of individuals by weapon detectors, and 5 percent by physical search
of carry-on items. See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11 at 9; 2d 1978 FAA
Report, supra note 24 at 8; 1st 1978 FAA Report, supra note 24, at 13.
3 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 20 (Exhibit 1).
37 Id.
Although there were 31 hijackings of American airliners during the
6+-year period between January, 1973, and June 30, 1979, none involved real
firearms or high explosives smuggled through the passenger screening system.
Id. at 1. By contrast, of the 46 hijackings of foreign air carriers that occurred
during the 30-month period between January 1, 1977 and June 30, 1979, at
least 31 of the incidents occurred because of inadequate passenger screening
employed by foreign airlines in countries outside the United States which per-
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Of those 25 attempted skyjackings of U.S. carriers between 1973
and 1978, only one was successful, compared with the eight successful hijackings in 1972 alone."'

Viewing the post-January, 1973 period as a whole, it would
appear that the institution of a mandatory pre-boarding passenger
screening system that is applied to all passengers and their carryon items, using sophisticated metal detecting devices and x-ray

machines or physical searches, has directly resulted in the occurrence of four related phenomena: (1) a decrease in the number
of attempted hijackings of U.S. commercial air carriers; (2) a
decline in the successfulness of any skyjackings that are attempted;
(3) a virtual halt in the number of firearms or high explosives that
pass undetected onto airliners with boarding passengers; and (4)
a concomitant reduction in the number of passengers suffering

bodily injury or death as the result of being assaulted by skyjackers
of U.S. air carriers."9 It is not certain whether this success was
accomplished primarily through deterrence of potential hijackers
or through detection of the weapons carried by would-be hijackers."
mitted real weapons or explosives to be carried on board the aircraft. See 2d
1978 FAA Report, supra note 24, at 7; see also 1979 FAA Report, supra note
11, at 6. Many foreign airports employ less than adequate security measures.
Blumenthal, supra note 30. American commercial air carriers are required to
employ the minimum pre-flight screening measures even when serving foreign
airports. However, 49 U.S.C. § 1356(a) (1977) requires the Secretary of Transportation to compensate any air carrier requesting such for expenditures attributable to screening facilities for passengers moving in foreign transportation.
-"During the same 6-year period there were 110 hijacking attempts lodged
against foreign airliners outside the United States, 1979 FAA Report, supra note
11, at 21 (Exhibit 2), of which at least 44 were successful, 1st 1978 FAA Report,
supra note 24, at 3. This great disparity in the number and successfulness of
hijackings perpetrated against foreign air carriers as opposed to American air
carriers was not present prior to 1973. 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 21
(Exhibit 2).
- Fewer bodily injuries to or deaths of passengers of American airliners arising
out of skyjackings would seem to be the likely result of fewer hijackings and
more importantly, fewer armed hijackers. By contrast, deaths and bodily injuries due to worldwide criminal incidents involving civil aviation have not decreased substantially since January, 1973. See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11,
at 27 (Exhibit 8).
40 It has been posited that the fundamental purpose of an elaborate preflight passenger surveillance system is one of deterrence of potential hijackings.
See, e.g., United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1973);
McGinley, supra note 30, at 304; AREY, supra note 10, at 234-42. On the other
hand, it has also been asserted that the real objective of pre-boarding screening
procedures is not necessarily to keep out the skyjacker, but rather to keep out
any weapons or explosives he might attempt to take on board. See, e.g., CLYNE,

1980]

COMMENTS

Nevertheless, the ostensible impressiveness of post-January,
1973 statistics with regard to skyjacking of American airliners

should not be utilized to veil or downplay a legitimate and substantial threat to the physical safety and mental well-being of passengers on U.S. commercial air carriers."' Since the system of
screening all embarking passengers and their carry-on baggage
was instituted in January, 1973, there have been at least 45 at-

tempted hijackings of U.S. air carriers in domestic and international flights, thirteen of which have proven successful.42 With the
exception of 1976, every year has seen the number of hijackings
128 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CLYNE].
This writer would submit that any successful preboarding passenger screening system should be designed both to deter and disarm potential hijackers.
See United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S.
991 (1972). In the first place, a very effective screening system that detects
virtually all weapons or explosives that embarking passengers might attempt
to carry through screening checkpoints will undoubtedly be the best deterrent.
Secondly, while conventional deterrents may be effective against "sky bandits"
who try so-called "Jesse-James skyjackings," or crimes committed for money,
see, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 225 N.W.2d 831,
832-34 (Minn. 1975) (plaintiff airline recovered under a blanket crime policy
from defendant insurer $200,000.00, which was paid to a skyjacker [D. B.
Cooper] who parachuted out rear of aircraft after receiving money), conventional deterrents are of little use against hijackers seeking political escape, since
they are normally desperate, and of probably no use against hijackers who are
lunatics, or against political terrorists who are more concerned with media
coverage than the consequences of apprehension. See CLYNE, supra note 78, at
121-26; E. MCWHINNEY, THE ILLEGAL DIVERSION OF AIRCRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-13 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MCWHINNEY]. On the other
hand, a screening system aimed at disarming would-be hijackers may not stop
the "bluff-artist" who has no weapon at all, but relies on the air carrier's unwillingness to take chances. CLYNE, supra note 78, at 121. FAA statistics indicate that there were at least 79 potential hijackings during the 6 -year period
between January, 1973, and June 30, 1979, that were not deterred, but were
thwarted by the preboarding screening system. 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11,
at 4.
41 Between
1974 and June 30, 1979, worldwide criminal acts against civil
aviation resulted in 755 deaths and 689 injuries, with 116 deaths and 120 injuries involving U.S. civil aviation. See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 9,
27 (Exhibit 8).
1 See notes 12 and 13 supra. Twelve out of the 13 successful skyjackings
occurred during the 14-month period between June 10, 1979, and August 16,
1980, and eleven of those 12 involved domestic flights. See Miami Herald, Aug.
17, 1980, at 1, col. 5 (reporting three skyjackings, two of which occurred on
domestic flights); N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1980, at 12, col. 5; Wash. Post, Aug. 14,
1980, at 5, col. 1; Wash. Post, Aug. 11, 1980, at 11, col. 5; Wash. Post, July
23, 1980, at 6, col. 2; Wash. Post, April 10, 1980, at 11, col. 3; N.Y. Times,
Jan. 27, 1980, at 18, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1979, IV, at 20, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, June 22, 1979, at 3, col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 12, 1979, at 1, col. 1;
N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
AN ANATOMY OF SKYJACKING
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of U.S. airliners increase from the preceding year since the dramatic reduction between 1972 and 1973. ' Furthermore, of the 45
times that a skyjacking has been tried aboard American airliners

during the 7y'-year period since January, 1973, more than half
(28) have occurred since the beginning of 1978," and more hijacking attempts were perpetrated against U.S. air carriers in 1979

(10) than in any year since 1972."
The airline industry's previously unblemished record as to preventing firearms or high explosives from passing undetected through
pre-boarding passenger screening checkpoints was recently stained

by the aforementioned hijacking of a Delta airliner to Cuba in
which the skyjacker succeeded in smuggling a handgun on board
the aircraft." Furthermore, since January, 1973, there have been

seven attempted hijackings of U.S. air carriers in which knives or
other weapons (not firearms or explosive devices) penetrated the
preboarding passenger screening and were carried on board by the
skyjacker.' 7 Hence, the security devices utilized in the passenger
31979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 20 (Exhibit 1).
" See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 20 (Exhibit 1); see also notes
9 and 13 supra, and hijackings cited therein. 22 of these 28 hijackings involved
domestic flights. See note 24 supra.
4See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 20 (Exhibit 1). Twenty-seven
hijacking incidents involving U.S. air carriers occurred in 1972 which the FAA
considers the last of the "peak" hijacking years. 2d 1978 FAA Report, supra
note 24, at 2. With ten hijackings having already occurred during the first eight
months of 1980, see note 9 supra, it is likely that the trend of annual increases
in hijackings of U.S. airliners will continue.
I Dallas Morning News, Jan. 26, 1980, at 1, col. 1; see notes 1-6 supra, and
accompanying text. Furthermore, it has previously been noted that four recent
hijackings of U.S. airliners involved incidents where the hijackers smuggled glass
containers containing gasoline aboard the aircraft. See note 14 supra.
"7See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 1; see also notes 12 and 13
supra, and hijackings cited therein. The most recent attempted hijacking in
which a knife was utilized occurred on November 24, 1979, when a hijacker,
armed with a Bowie knife and demanding to be flown to Iran, seized control of
an American Airlines Boeing 727 jetliner bound for Los Angeles from San
Antonio. After the hijacker held some of the passengers and crew for four hours,
he was captured when F.B.I. agents rushed the plane. N.Y. Times, Nov. 25,
1979, at 17, col. 1. No attempted hijacking since January, 1973, where a weapon
other than a firearm or explosive device was smuggled through screening stations has proven successful. See note 12 supra, and hijackings cited therein.
In twenty-one of the thirty-two U.S. hijacking incidents since January 1, 1973,
in which the hijacker passed through normal screening procedures, no weapon
at all was utilized despite the hijacker's claims of possessing a weapon or
explosive device. See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 1; see also notes 9
and 13 supra, and hijackings cited therein.
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screening system and/or the people who operate them are mani-

festly not infallible.
Not every hijacking of an American air carrier has resulted from
a penetration of an airline's pre-boarding screening system. Fourteen of the 45 hijacking incidents involving American air carriers
since January, 1973, have involved circumstances in which the
hijacker in some way circumvented the pre-boarding screening
stations or forced his way on board the aircraft with his weapon
already drawn."8 It must also be recognized that pre-boarding passenger screening systems are not designed to detect weapons or
explosive devices that might be smuggled aboard airliners in
checked baggage,' nor to guard against criminal attacks on passengers at the airport before or after boarding."° Indeed, to the ex48 See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 1; see also notes 9 and 13 supra,
and hijackings cited therein. In addition, see 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at
3, describing an incident that occurred in April, 1979, in which a man armed
with a knife took a woman hostage at a screening point in the terminal at the
Sydney, Australia International Airport and forced his way past officials and
on to Pan American World Airways 747 airliner where he demanded flight
to Moscow. The would-be hijacker was shot and killed by police when he tried
to ignite a can of gunpowder he had in his possession. One policeman was
injured and the hostage received minor throat lacerations.
"Although in 1978 and 1979 no U.S. commercial aircraft received damage
due to an explosive device, there have been 10 such explosions aboard American commercial aircraft since January, 1973, a figure that represents no decline
from the pre-1973 period. See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 26 (Exhibit
7). During the 6 -year period between January 1, 1973, and June 30, 1979,
U.S. commercial aircraft received 9,455 bomb threats, 222 of which were
considered extortion attempts, and eight explosive devices were discovered on
board the aircraft. Id. at 24, 26.
On March 25, 1979, a bomb contained within a piece of checked luggage
exploded before it was loaded on to the Trans World Airlines aircraft for
which it was destined at JFK Airport in New York City. Four baggage handlers
were injured and other baggage was seriously damaged. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26,
1979, at 1, col. 2.
As for weapons concealed in checked baggage, it should be noted that the
1972 Japanese terrorists who attacked passengers at the Lod Airport in Tel Aviv,
Israel extracted their weapons from the checked baggage prior to the attack,
after transporting the weapons from Japan. See Hernandez v. Air France, 545
F.2d 279, 281 (1st Cir. 1976); see note 94 infra. However, a passenger may
transport an unloaded weapon in his checked baggage if he declares its presence
to the air carrier. See 49 U.S.C. S 1472 (1976); 14 C.F.R. § 121.585(b)-(c)
(1980).
50 Pre-boarding screening of passengers is seen as "incapable of deterring
terrorists who enter a terminal undetected and indiscriminately attack waiting
passengers." Comment, Deterring Airport Terrorist Attacks and Compensating
the Victims, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1134 n. 3 (1977). On the other hand, many
airlines have resorted to extending security areas by "sterilizing" airport concourses, i.e. doing the screening farther away from the boarding gates to de-
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tent that aircraft themselves are rendered less vulnerable targets
because of effective airline security measures, passengers in airport
terminals may be in greater danger than before the advent of
strict airline security."
Thus, in a recent report to Congress, the FAA declared that:
The threat of aircraft hijacking and aviation sabotage persists.
It is compounded by increasing terrorist activities worldwide and
the continuing resort to explosives in the commission of crimes.
Aviation remains an attractive and, because of its very nature, a
vulnerable target for the mentally deranged, the criminal as well
as the political terrorist. The security measures in place are
generally effective and provide cornerstones and basic procedures
which can be expanded . . ."
Because of this persisting threat, one that is apparently increasing at least in view of the recent skyjackings,"' it can be expected
that airline passengers will continue to face the risk of a harrowing
experience in which their lives and property are placed in actual
jeopardy, or in the case in which the presence of a weapon or
explosive device is faked, in perceived jeopardy. While in theory
a passenger who has suffered serious physical and/or emotional
crease the area in which unscreened persons are walking around. See Blumenthal,
supra note 30.
See also Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977)
and Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,

429 U.S. 890 (1976) both ruling that passengers wounded in the August 5, 1973,
attack by members of the Black September terrorist organization on the Hellenikin Airport in Athens, Greece, could recover damages under Article 17
of the Warsaw Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agreement, which
creates an irrebuttable presumption of air carrier liability for injuries sustained
while embarking or disembarking. Cf. In re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154 (D.P.R.
1975), a.J'd sub. nom., Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1979),

which denied recovery to passengers wounded on May 30, 1972, in an attack
on the Lod International Airport in Tel Aviv, Israel, by terrorists of the Japanese
Red Army. The decision was predicated on grounds that the passengers were
attempting to retrieve baggage in the airport terminal and were no longer in
the course of disembarking. 405 F. Supp. at 158.
5' Comment, Deterring Airport Terrorist Attacks and Compensating the Vic-

tims, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1134 (1977).
"11979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 19. What was once considered the
crime of "homesick Cubans," psychotics, and extortionists is now frequently
utilized as a tool of the sophisticated political terrorist. See Blumenthal, supra
note 30. It has been estimated that two-thirds of air hijackings are politically
motivated. See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 30, at 297.
" See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 20 (Exhibit 1); see also notes
44 and 45 supra, and accompanying text.
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damage as result of an attempted or successful hijacking or act
of sabotage could bring a tort action against the hijacker or sabo-

teur,' in reality such a suit would not be worthwhile in the vast
majority of cases. Normally, hijackers do not have recoverable

assets." Furthermore, if the hijacking is successful, the perpetrator
may no longer be subject to the jurisdiction of American courts."
In the case of sabotage, the saboteur may never be known."
A suit against the United States government for injuries arising
out of a domestic skyjacking incident would likely prove equally
fruitless, not because of the inability to recover upon a judgment
awarded, but because of an inability to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In the first place, the duty to screen passengers

for weapons has expressly been placed on the airlines." Secondly,
such an action against the federal government would have to be
" Such an action might be brought for assault or battery. See Abramovsky,
supra note 30, at 341. Additionally, an action for intentional infliction of
mental distress or false imprisonment might lie against a hijacker. See, e.g.,
Karfunkle v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971, 977 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
"Abramovsky, supra note 30, at 342; see also Barrett, Terrorism and the
Airline Passengers, 128 NEW L.J. 499 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Barrett]; Comment, Aircraft Hijacking: Criminal and Civil Aspects, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 72, 90
(1969). The same would seem applicable to saboteurs. Those that are apprehended and are not completely destitute are further subject to the expense of defending against a criminal prosecution which may likely result in imprisonment.
5 Abramovsky, supra note 30, at 342; Skyjacking, supra note 8, at 40; McWHINNEY, supra note 40, at 29-30. However, the United States is party to the
Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970,
T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (1970) which provides for the mandatory punishment or
extradition of all skyjackers taken into custody in a signatory state. See McGinley, supra note 30, at 296. While 85.4 percent of skyjackers escaped prosecution in 1969, only 28.1 percent did so in 1972. CLYNE, supra note 40, at 175.
11 Eighty-four percent of serious bomb threats made against U.S. aircraft
during the first six months of 1979 were transmitted telephonically. 1979 FAA
Report, supra note 11, at 7.
"An argument in favor of Government liability might be an analogy to
principles of law concerning government liability for the negligent operations
of its air traffic controllers. See McCLINTOCK, supra note 8, at 80; Skyjacking,
supra note 8, at 51-53; see generally Comment, Government Liability-Air
Traffic Controllers-Duty of Care, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 185 (1967). For a
study of the plaintiff's right to bring an action against a governmental entity
for injuries arising out of an airport attack, see Comment, Deterring Airport
Terrorist Attacks and Compensating Their Victims, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1134
(1977).
5
See 49 U.S.C. § 1356 (1976); see also 14 C.F.R. § 121.538, 121.585
(1980).
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brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act," which does not apply

to a claim "based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation"'" nor to a claim "based upon the exercise or perform-

ance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty" on the part of a government agency or employee." Both
of these limitations would pose significant barriers to actions by
airline passengers against the federal government to recover dam-

ages due to injuries received in the process of a hijacking or act of
sabotage because the federal role in preventing hijackings is primarily regulatory." The regulatory functions of government agencies are the types of activity exempted by the foregoing exceptions." On the other hand, if a federal officer (not involved in
policy formulation), such as an FBI agent, assumes an operational
role in a particular emergency situation, like a hijacking, the
employee's negligent handling of the situation may result in govern-

ment liability for resulting injuries, as was the result in Downs v.
United States."
For the passenger who is injured on a U.S. domestic flight, an
§5 1346(b), 2671-80 (1976).
6128 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
62 Id.
63The current federal role in the airline security program embodied in the
Air Transportation Security Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. 5 1356 (1976), has been
one of regulation, assistance, and enforcement. The United States Supreme
Court has decided that immunized discretion of federal employees "includes
determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans,
specifications or schedules of operations, [footnote omitted] where there is
room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion." Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15, 35 (1953).
"See, e.g., Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 996 (6th Cir. 1975).
See also Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307, 313 (7th Cir. 1978) (courts will defer
to discretion granted the FAA by Congress to determine the type and scope
of air safety rules, even if on its own the court may have adopted different
standards).
1522 F.2d at 997. The Downs case would appear to be limited to an incident in which a government agent intervenes, on behalf of the Government,
in a hijacking already in progress. In case of the agent's negligence, the airline
may be jointly liable for resulting injuries to passengers. In Downs only a small
passenger airline was involved. Id. at 994. A Pacific Southwest airliner was
involved in an attempted hijacking on July 5, 1972, where one passenger was
killed and two wounded in an exchange of gunfire between two hijackers, who
were subsequently killed, and FBI agents. N.Y. Times, July 5, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
It is not known whether any claims or lawsuits resulted from this incident
although none were located through research.
6028 U.S.C.
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alternative to suit against the hijacker or against the federal gov-

ernment is an action for negligence against the airline involved. It
is the position of this writer that in certain circumstances an injured passenger could recover in such a suit against an airline,
particularly if the principles of negligence per se or res ipsa loquitur
were applied.
IV.

AIRLINE LIABILITY

Because the Warsaw system operates as a treaty, and therefore
the supreme law of the land, it preempts local law and provides the
exclusive, though virtually certain, relief available to injured passengers on international flights where it applies." On the other
hand, in the absence of a statute establishing a different rule,
negligence on the part of an airline must be established in order
to hold the airline liable for damages incurred as a result of a
hijacking or related crime perpetrated against a domestic flight."
" United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Burnett v. Trans World
Airlines, 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co.,
351 F. Supp. 702, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afl'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973);
Bradfield v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 681, 684, 152 Cal. Reptr.
172, 175 (1979); Schedlmayer v. Trans International Airlines, 416 N.Y.S.2d 461,
463 (1979). In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1246
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) the court stated that under Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention
"[a]ny action, however founded, seeking recovery for injuries comprehended by
Article 17 [bodily injuries] and caused by an accident occurring in a place specified
by Article 17 [on board the aircraft or in the course of embarking or disembarking] can be brought only subject to the conditions and limits established
by the Warsaw system. To this extent at least . . . the treaty provides for the
exclusive relief available for injury sustained in international transportation."
Id. at 1246. Those types of injury not comprehended by the Warsaw system
"should be governed exclusively by the substantive law which would be applicable if the treaty did not exist." Id. at 1247. The Warsaw system limits only those
claims for injury comprehended by Article 17. Id. at 1248.
67 Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore, 266 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1959); Noel v.
United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 929, 940 (D. Del. 1962); Ness v. West
Coast Airlines, Inc., 90 Idaho 111, 410 P.2d 965 (1965); Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796, 799 (1964); see also MCCLINTOCK, supra
note 8, at 68; Skyjacking, supra note 8, at 42; Tompkins, The Aftermath of a Hijacking-Passenger Claims and Insurance, 39 J. AIR L. & CoM. 381, 384 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Tompkins].
Passengers seeking recovery for injuries received during hijackings of American carriers engaged in international transportation must generally bring their
actions under the provisions of the Warsaw Convention as amended by the
Montreal Agreement. See notes 15, 16 supra. Article 17 of the Warsaw convention provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
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This would generally require that the plaintiff passenger prove that
the airline was under a duty to exercise care towards him, that
by acting, or failing to act, in a certain manner the duty was
breached by the airline, that the breach of duty was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff passenger's injuries, and that as a result of
those injuries the plaintiff passenger suffered certain identifiable
damages." Some jurisdictions would also require a showing that
the plaintiff passenger was not guilty of contributory negligence. 9
A. Scope of Duty and Determination of Breach
In the context of a domestic flight, the duty of an airliner to its
passengers is defined by state law."0 An airline is a common carrier,
and like all common carriers, it bears a very high standard of care
as to its passengers.' In characterizing the scope of this duty,
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
49 Stat. 3018 (1936) (emphasis supplied).
" Contrastingly, an injured passenger on an international flight who brings
suit to recover under the Warsaw system needs to show an injury, proximate
cause, and damages. See Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238
n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also note 15 supra. Cf. Orr v. New Orleans Pub.
Serv. Inc., 349 So. 2d 417, 419 (La. App. 1977) which held that the mere showing of injury to a fee-paying passenger and his failure to reach his destination
safely establishes a prima facie case of negligence and imposes upon the carrier
the burden to overcome the prima facie case. See also Campbell v. New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc., 369 So. 2d 733, 735 (La. App. 1979) (requiring carrier to
"convincingly" overcome plaintiff passenger's prima facie case).
6 See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 416 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; see also Abramovsky, supra note 35, at 343.
In the context of international flights and the governing Warsaw system, the
Article 20(1) provision that the "carrier shall not be liable if he proves that
he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that
it was impossible for him or them to take such measures" has been waived by
carriers flying to and from the U.S. under the Montreal Agreement. See Warsaw, supra note 15, at art. 20(1); Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,
427 F. Supp. 971, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see note 16 supra.
70 See, e.g., Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization
and Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 597 (1954). Although federal law [49 U.S.C.
§§ 1421-32 (1976)] governs the operation, control and safety of carriers, see
Manfredonia v. American Airlines, Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 17,368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979),
citing City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973), the
federal regulatory statute provides that "[n]othing contained in this chapter shall
in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by
statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies." 49
U.S.C. § 1506 (1976).
71 See, e.g., Delta Airlines v. Gibson, 550 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977-El Paso, no writ); see also PROSSER, supra note 69, § 34, at 180-81.
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courts have held that a carrier's duty to its passengers requires

the exercise of the "highest degree of care,"" the "highest degree
of vigilance, care, and precaution,". "utmost care,"" and a "high
degree of care."" The high risks of air travel and the control exer-

cised by the airline are viewed as justification for the higher
standard." The feeling is that "[a]irline passengers are completely
at the mercy of the carrier and are entitled to assume that the
highest degree of care is being taken for their safety."" On the
other hand, it has been consistently held that a common carrier
Congress has recognized this policy. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1421 (1976) provides in
part:
(a) [t]he Administrator [of the Federal Aviation Administration]
is empowered and it shall be his duty to promote safety of flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing and revising from
time to time [various standards, rules and regulations] (6) . . . as
the Administration may find necessary to provide adequately for
national security and safety in air commerce.
(b) [i]n prescribing standards, rules, and regulations, and in
issuing certificates under this subchapter, the Administrator shall
give full consideration to the duty resting upon air carriers to
perform their services with the highest possible degree of safety
in the public interest...
Id. (emphasis added). Cf. 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1976) which uses "[tihe Secretary
of Transportation" instead of "[tihe Administrator." Some states, e.g., New York,
have abandoned the duty of high degree of care in favor of a standard of
reasonable care under the circumstances. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 8 at 66.
72Cattaro
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Va.
1964); Letsos v. Chicago Transit Auth., 47 I1l. 2d 437, 254 N.E.2d 645 (1969);
Quigley v. Wilson Line of Mass., 154 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Mass. 1958); Southeastern
Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639, 355 S.W.2d 436 (1962); Virginia v.
United Airlines, 248 S.E.2d 124, 130 (1978).
73
Orr. v. New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc., 349 So. 2d 417, 419 (La. App. 1977).
4
! Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326, 332 (5th Cir. 1959);
Roberts v. Trans World Airlines, 225 Cal. App. 2d 344, 37 Cal. Rptr. 291
(1964); Exton v. Cent. R.R., 62 N.J.L. 7, 42 A. 486, 489 (1899).
7
1McCoy
v. Chicago Transit Auth., 69 Ill. 2d 280, 371 N.E.2d 625 (1977);
Smith v. West Suburban Transit Lines, Inc., 27 Ill. App. 3d 220, 326 N.E.2d 449,
451 (1975); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796, 799
(1964).
76 See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 8, at 66; Skyjacking, supra note 8, at 43.
It is a traditional principle that the greater the danger, the greater the care
required. See e.g., Tom v. Days of '47, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 386, 401 P.2d 946
(1965); Ziser v. Colonial Western Airways, Inc., 162 A. 591 (N.J. 1932).
However, arguably the greater amount of care is only what is reasonable care
under the circumstances. The primary rationale for the higher standard of care
imposed on common carriers is the degree of control exercised over the passenger during the transportation. Comment, Deterring Airport Terrorist Attacks
and Compensating the Victims, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1134, 1159 (1977).
"Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1978).
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is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers'."
At common law the general rule in tort is that a private person
has no duty to protect other persons from the criminal acts of
third persons. 9 Hence, a party's nonfeasance does not normally
result in liability being imposed upon him."0 An exception has long
existed in tort law where certain special relationships combined
with special conditions and circumstances have resulted in the
imposition of liability for failure to undertake protective measures to prevent harm from befalling another due to the criminal
act of a third person."' Thus, the special relationship which exists
between a common carrier and its passengers has been held to
impose a duty upon the carrier to protect its passengers from the
harmful acts of third persons, including employees, other passengers, and strangers.'
However, even "where the highest degree of care characterized
the relationship, the criminal acts of third parties imposes no liability unless there are present special circumstances that create in
the minds of reasonable men an apprehension of danger."' A carrier will generally be held liable for the injuries to a passenger
which are caused by the assault or other misconduct of a third
person only where the carrier has reason to anticipate the incident,
i.e., where the danger is known to the carrier or should have been
known to the carrier, but the carrier nevertheless fails to exercise
a degree of care and vigilance practicable under the circumstances
to prevent the injury." In Quigley v. Wilson Line of Massachusetts,
'Ness v. West Coast Airlines, Inc., 90 Idaho 111, 410 P.2d 965, 967 (1965);
Orr v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 349 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 1977); Quigley v.
Wilson Line of Mass., 154 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Mass. 1958); Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796, 799 (1964). "A carrier does not, by its contract to transport safely, insure safe arrival." Higgins v. New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc., 347 So. 2d 944, 946 (La. App. 1977).
"oSee PROSSER, supra note 69, § 56, at 340.
"' Nonfeasance, the failure to undertake measures to protect another from
harm, is distinguished from misfeasance, active misconduct causing positive injury to another. Id. at 339.
811 Id. at 341.
"3 See, e.g., Kenny v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 581 F.2d 351 (3d Cir.
1978); Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1959);
McCoy v. Chicago Transit Auth., 69 I11. 2d 280, 371 N.E.2d 625 (1977). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS, § 302B, Comment e, and § 314A (1965).
83 Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Tenn. 1975), interpreting the
rule of Railroad v. Hatch, 116 Tenn. 580, 94 S.W. 671 (1906).
"See Kenan v. Houston, 150 Fla. 357, 7 So. 2d 837, 838 (1942); McCoy v.
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Inc.,' the Massachusetts Supreme Court declared that a carrier's
liability rests upon the duty which is imposed by law "to anticipate
that which is reasonably foreseeable and to prevent that which is
reasonably preventable in the way of violent injury to its passengers."86 In Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.,"7 the federal
appellate court applied Florida law and held that "[i]f the injury
could have been reasonably anticipated in time to have prevented
its occurrence, the carrier is subjected to the highest degree of
care to its passengers either to protect him from or to warn him
of the danger."8 In this regard, the Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides in section 302B, comment e, that there are situations
which arise when one party is under a special responsibility toward
another, such that he is required, as a reasonable person, to anticipate and guard against the criminal misconduct of others." Section
314A states that because of the special relationship, a common
carrier is under a duty to take reasonable action to protect its
passengers against unreasonable risk of physical harm."
Despite some state court decisions that have indicated that a
carrier's liability for criminal attacks on its passengers might be
predicted only on some action or conduct of the particular assailant
that gave advance notice to the carrier of the probability of danger,"
it is highly unlikely that an argument by a defendant airliner that
a hijacking incident was not an anticipated danger would succeed
in precluding its liability for resulting injuries to its passengers.'
It has been held that it is knowledge of the "conditions" which are
likely to result in danger to a passenger,' or it is the "nature" of
Chicago Transit Auth., 69 Ill. 2d 280, 371 N.E.2d 625, 628 (1977); Letsos v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 47 Ill. 2d 437, 441, 265 N.E.2d 645, 650, 653 (1970);

Railroad v. Hatch, 116 Tenn. 580, 94 S.W. 671 (1906); Fuller v. Southwestern
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960, writ.
ref'd n.r.e.).
81154 N.E.2d 77 (Mass. 1958).
8 ld. at 80.
87

8

266 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1959).
Id. at 331.

OF TORTS, § 302B, comment e (1965).
OF TORTS, § 314A(1)(a) (1965).
9' See, e.g., Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 193 (Tenn. 1975).
92 For one thing, use of the hijacker behavioral profile should alert airline
personnel to potentially dangerous individuals. See note 30 supra.
3
See Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497, 503 (1943);

9 RESTATEMENT

80

(SECOND)

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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the threat which should be anticipated,"4 as opposed to the particular threat of a particular offender, that gives rise to the duty
on the part of the carrier to prevent the criminal assault. Additionally, knowledge of prior criminal assaults or violence has been
held to invoke the carrier's duty to act to prevent potential assaults
or acts of violence." Comment f to section 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "[i]f the place or character of
[a party's] business or his past experience, is such that he should
reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of
third persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may
be under a duty to take precautions against [such conduct] ...
As has been previously noted, there have been 45 attempted hijackings of U.S. air carriers since January, 1973, 28 of which have
occurred since the beginning of 1978," and at least 79 potential
hijackings have been thwarted at the passenger screening stations
since January, 1973." There have also been over 1500 serious
bomb threats lodged against American air carriers." The frequency
of attempted skyjackings and related criminal acts along with the
fact that extensive pre-flight screening of all passengers is conducted, as required by law, leaves little doubt that hijacking attempts and similar acts of crime are to be reasonably anticipated.
Furthermore, skyjacking and sabotage are viewed as "inevitable
corollaries to modem techniques of air transport. "'' 9
Haynes v. Chicago Transit Auth., 59 Ill.
App. 3d 97, 376 N.E.2d 680, 682-83

(1978).
" See Fuller v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 S.W.2d 455, 458

(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

" See, e.g., Haynes v. Chicago Transit Auth., 59 Ill. App. 3d 997, 376
N.E.2d 680, 683 (1978); Mancha v. Field Museum of Natural History, 5 Ill.

App. 3d 699, 283 N.E.2d 899 (1972); Amoruso v. New York City Transit
Auth., 207 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1960).
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 344, comment f (1965).
' See notes 13 and 44 supra, and accompanying text.
: See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 4, 9.
" See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 24 (Exhibit 5); 2d 1978 FAA
Report, supra note 24, at 21 (Exhibit 5). Two of four criteria utilized to de-

termine whether a bomb threat is to be considered serious are whether the
threat results in inconvenience to passengers, and whether the threat results in
a search or otherwise disrupts airline operations. 1979 FAA Report, supra note

11, at 24 (Exhibit 5).
10 CLYNE, supra note 40, at 10. See also Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1977) where skyjacking and sabotage, as
threats posed to passengers boarding or on board an aircraft, were viewed as

1980]

COMMENTS

(1) Pre-flight Screening
From the foregoing it can be concluded that American commercial air carriers have a common law duty to protect their
passengers against attempted hijackings and similar threatening
acts by implementing security measures designed to prevent such
criminal activity. The duty aspect of the plaintiff passenger's action in negligence is further enhanced by the fact that the United
States Congress has expressly placed the obligation to screen embarking passengers and their carry-on items for weapons upon the
air carriers.'' The express purpose was "to protect persons and
property aboard aircraft operating in air transportation. . . against
acts of criminal violence and aircraft piracy.'' °. Pursuant to the
legislative mandate, the FAA has promulgated regulations, one of
which generally prohibits an air carrier from allowing "any person
to have . . . a deadly or dangerous weapon, either concealed or
unconcealed, accessible to him while aboard an aircraft being
operated by" the air carrier."' In light of this regulation and the
clear intent and purpose of the Air Transportation Security Act
of 1974"' (to protect passengers in engaging in commercial air
travel from hijacking and similar crimes), it is submitted that a
passenger who has suffered injuries arising out of a hijacking incident, in which the hijacker managed to smuggle a weapon on board,
can present a colorable claim for imposition of negligence per se
upon the airline involved.'0 '
part of terrorism that is "a risk which accompanies international air travel."
Id. at 159.
10149 U.S.C. § 1856 (1976).
10249 U.S.C. § 1357 (1976). For the view that the responsibility for detecting potential hijackers and their weapons should be delegated to experienced
law enforcement officers funded by the federal government and not the business
of airlines, see McGinley, supra note 30, at 320.
'o314 C.F.R. § 121.585(a) (1980). Cf. 14 C.F.R. § 121.585(b) (1980)
which provides that an air carrier may not "knowingly permit any passenger
to carry . . . , while aboard an aircraft being operated by the [air carrier], in
checked baggage, a loaded firearm." Id.
"-49 U.S.C. § 1356 (1976).
' See, e.g., Chumney v. Nixon, 615 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1980) (existence
of the right to maintain civil action for damages due to assault aboard aircraft may be implied from a federal criminal statute designed to protect
airline passengers). See also, Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 227
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920);
Tompkins, supra note 67, at 386; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS,
§ 288B (1965). On the other hand, section 288A of the Restatement recog-
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In Manfredonia v. American Airlines, ' it was recently held
that a breach of a federal statute or regulation may provide grounds
for a cause of action for damages in a state court arising from
injury sustained thereby. ' The case involved an airline passenger
who was assaulted in ffight by an intoxicated fellow passenger.
While on the issue of common law negligence the defendant airline
was determined not to be liable for failing to exercise proper care
in protecting the plaintiff passenger from injury, the appellate court
remanded after ruling that a cause of action on behalf of the
injured passenger is implied for violation of the FAA regulation
which forbids the service of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated
person.'" The court declared that a breach of a statute may provide
a basis for action for damages if: "(1) the regulation was intended
to protect a particular class of persons; (2) there was an intention to create or deny a private right; (3) the right would be consistent with the goal of the statute; and (4) the cause of action is
one traditionally left to state law."'' °
Assuming that a commercial air carrier has a duty to protect its
passengers from the threat of skyjackings and related criminal acts
of third parties by preventing potential skyjackers and saboteurs
from taking aboard its aircraft weapons and explosives or incendiary devices, it follows that the air carrier's failure to detect
such criminal instruments during the pre-boarding screening procedures would constitute a breach of that duty."' In Edwards v.
nizes "excused violations" where the actor, in the exercise of reasonable care,
is unable to comply. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 288A (1965). Furthermore, negligence per se would probably not apply to cases where a saboteur
or extortionist places a bomb in checked baggage that is taken aboard and suc-

cessfully diverts the route of the aircraft or causes the device to detonate.
Although the Air Transportation Security Act of 1974 makes it a federal crime
to place or attempt to place an explosive or incendiary device aboard a commercial aircraft, 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (1976), the law does not expressly place the
obligation for preventing such an occurrence upon airlines. Cf. 14 C.F.R. S
121.538(b) (1980), which requires, air carriers to implement a system designed,

inter alia, to prevent the carriage of any explosive or incendiary device in checked
baggage.
'o 15 Av. Cas. 17,638 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
1

Id. at 17,642. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).

log 15 Av. Cas. 17,638 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
'0 Id. See Rauch v. United Instruments,
Matter of Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974,
"0 See Virginia v. United Airlines, Inc.,
In Airline Motor Coaches, Inc. v. Carver,

548 F.2d 452, 457 (3d Cir. 1976);
39 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
248 S.E.2d 124, 130 (Va. 1978).
226 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. 1950),
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National Airlines, Inc.,"1 a state appellate court in Florida held

that a cause of action upon which relief could be granted was
stated by a passenger who, in a claim based in part upon negligence,
alleged consequential damages arising out of a 1971 hijacking of
a domestic flight to Cuba." ' The hijackers were armed, and the
plaintiff contended that the airline as a carrier breached its duty
to take extreme precautions to prevent hijackings by screening
its passengers for weapons and explosives.""
Whether the penetration of the screening system was due to a
failure to utilize recognized measures or equipment or to an inadequate search or inspection of the hijacker's person and apparel
or of his carry-on baggage, or due to a malfunction of the mechanical or electronic detection devices, the airline would be culpable."'

It has been held that:
[A] passenger who pays his fare to a common carrier expects
safe transportation to his destination and a carrier is required
the Texas Supreme Court stated in a portentous decision that:
it could well be negligence to permit a passenger to bring in
with him what is obviously an open can of gasoline, or an uncrated dog. Even when the luggage admitted is legitimate, negligence may arise . . . where the luggage somehow comes to create

a dangerous situation of which the carrier's agents knew or would
have known if they had fulfilled their duty . . . of properly in-

specting or policing the vehicle.
In Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 A.D.2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827
(1972), rev'd on other grounds, 34 N.Y.2d 385, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974), the lower
court considered a claim by a passenger for damages due to extreme fright and
emotional injury arising out of a hijacking of an international flight. Although
the decision was based on the provisions of the Warsaw system, the common
law duty of air carriers to protect their passengers from assaults was noted.
337 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
" 307 So. 2d 244 (Fla. App. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 336 So. 2d 545

(Fla. 1976).
"' Id. The ruling of the appellate court was subsequently reversed by the
Florida Supreme Court because the injuries alleged were too remote. National
Airlines, Inc., v. Edwards, 336 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1976). See note 236 infra, and
accompanying text.
"1336 So. 2d at 546.
114See Virginia v. United Airlines, Inc., 248 S.E.2d 124, 130 (Va. 1978);
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 8, at 69-70; Skyjacking, supra note 8, at 42; Barrett,
supra note 55, at 502. See also 49 U.S.C. S 1374 (1976), which imposes a duty
upon every air carrier to provide safe and adequate service, equipment, and facilities in connection with air transportation. In Southeastern Airlines v. Hurd, 355
S.W.2d 436 (Tenn. 1962) it was decided that an air carrier owes its passengers
the highest degree of care with respect to service and maintenance of its equipment. Id. at 446.
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to do all that human care, vigilance and foresight can reasonably
do to transport its passengers safely, consistent with its mode of
conveyance and the practical operation of its business."'
Because of the high standard of care which an air carrier owes
its passengers, and given the carrier's duty to prevent weapons or
explosive devices from being taken aboard its aircraft by embarking passengers, one approach would be to find the airline negligent
if it could have prevented the skyjacking but failed to do so."1
In at least one jurisdiction, the trial court would, upon a showing
by a plaintiff-passenger of the occurrence of a skyjacking or related
crime, shift the burden to the air carrier to prove that the incident
was not the result of its negligence."'
This shifting of the burden of going forward with the evidence
is similar to the rebuttable presumption of breach of duty owed
that is used by some jurisdictions when a negligence claim is based
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur."' Although the theory of res
ipsa loquitur generally may not be applicable to cases involving
the liability of common carriers for injuries to their passengers
inflicted by third parties, an argument can be put forth that the
principle of res ipsa should be available to an injured passenger in
a hijacking case, at least in the context of determining whether an
airline is negligent for allowing weapons or explosive devices to
be taken aboard its aircraft.1" For instance, in the recent hijack115Letsos v. Chicago Transit Auth., 118 Il. App. 2d 26, 254 N.E.2d 645, 647

(1969), reversed, 47 Ill. 2d 437, 265 N.E.2d 650 (Ill. 1970). The reversal was
on factual grounds. See also Lutz v. Chicago Transit Auth., 36 II1. App. 2d 79,
183 N.E.2d 579, 581 (1962).
"

See, e.g., Campbell v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 369 So. 2d 733 (La.

App. 1979); Higgins v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 347 So. 2d 944 (La. App.

1977); Orr v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 349 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 1977).
117 See, e.g., Campbell v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 369 So. 2d 733 (La.
App. 1979); Higgins v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 347 So. 2d 944 (La. App.
1977); Orr v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 349 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 1977).
118 Res ipsa loquitur is utilized in cases where the mere fact that a particular
harm has occurred may itself tend to establish a breach of duty owed. See, e.g.,
Ten Ten Chestnut St. Corp. v. Quaker State Bottling Co., 186 Pa. Super Ct.
585, 142 A.2d 306 (1958); Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Helena v. Mattice, 219

Ark. 428, 242 S.W.2d 15 (1951); Johns v. Penn R. Co., 226 Pa. 319, 75 A.
408 (1910).

The majority of American courts regard res ipsa loquitur merely

as one form of circumstantial evidence which permits an inference of negligence. Bell & Koch, Inc. v. Stanley, 375 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1964); Gardner v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964); See generally

PROSSER, supra note 69, § 40 at 228-29.
I See generally PROSSER, supra note 69, § 39, at 24, setting out three con-
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ing of the Delta airliner to Cuba, the method used by the hijacker
to get the firearm through the screening checkpoint has not been
determined.' Under res ipsa the mere fact that the handgun was
taken aboard the aircraft would tend to establish a breach of the

duty of high care owed by the airline to its passengers. In the first
place, because it is mandatory today that all passengers and their
carry-on items be screened by the air carriers, and in light of the
sophisticated mechanisms available to detect such firearms, it would

seem that an incident of this type would not normally occur in
the absence of the carrier's negligence."' Secondly, the passenger
screening station and the detecting devices employed may have
been in the exclusive control of Delta at the time that the hijacker
passed through on his way to board the aircraft with the handgun."'
In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co.,"' the court held that injuries to a passenger sustained during a hijacking of an international flight are compensable under the Warsaw system and stated

that "the carrier is best qualified initially to develop defensive
mechanisms to avoid such incidents, since it physically controls
ditions usually necessary for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur:
"(1) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not
have been due to any voluntary act or contribution on the part of the plaintiff."
Id. See also Goldin, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Law, 18
OF TORTS § 328D
So. CAL. L. REV. 15, 124 (1945); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
(1965).
120 Speculation has suggested that the handgun was concealed in a baby's metal
seat carrier. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1980, at 18, col. 5.
"I See Shaw v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 50 Cal. App. 2d 153, 323 P.2d 391
(1958); Southeastern Aviation v. Hurd, 355 S.W.2d 436 (Tenn. 1962); Newberger v. Pokrass, 33 Wis. 2d 569, 148 N.W.2d 80 (1967). According to Prosser,
"[a]ll that is needed is evidence from which reasonable men can say that on
the whole it is more likely that there was negligence associated with the cause
of the event than that there was not." PROSSER, supra note 69, 5 39, at 218.
On the other hand, the airline might attempt to prove that it has done everything
possible to avert such an occurrence.
122See Gadde v. Michigan Consolidation Gas Co., 377 Mich. 117, 139 N.W.2d
722 (1966); Whitney v. Northwest Greyhound, 242 P.2d 257 (Mont. 1952).
To establish exclusive control by the defendant, it is enough to show that the
defendant has the right or power of control and the opportunity to exercise it,
or that the defendant is under a duty which cannot be delegated to another,
or that the defendant shares the duty and the responsibility at the time of the
negligence. See PROSSER, supra note 69, § 39, at 220.
123351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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the aircraft and access to it."1' Thirdly, it does not appear likely
that any passenger on the recently hijacked Delta flight, who may
have suffered severe traumatic damages resulting from the inci-

dent, would have contributed to his injuries by his own conduct."n
Thus, the three essential elements to the invocation of res ipsa

loquitur would appear to be present in a skyjacking incident like
the recent Delta hijacking where a hijacker succeeded in penetrating the airline's pre-flight screening system with a firearm.'
In addition to the use of devices designed to detect firearms and

other weapons, an air carrier has the authority to refuse transportation to a would-be passenger when in the reasonable judgment of
the carrier, the passenger might endanger the flight."" Nevertheless,
even given the existence of this authority and the availability of

sophisticated weapon detecting devices, the airlines may maintain
that it does not necessarily follow that the fact of an armed hi-

jacker on board a commercial aircraft is due to the air carrier's
negligence. The law certainly does not require air carriers to exercise all care that is within the human mind's conceptual capabilities
1

Id. at 707.
Simmons v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 709, 329 P.2d
929 (1958); Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp., 67 Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 577 (1967).
12 While res ipsa loquitur is not applicable against multiple defendants
where it is inferable that only one has been negligent, in the case of joint tortfeasors, e.g., where an injured passenger brings suit against the airline and the
skyjacker, res ipsa may be applied in favor of a passenger in his action against
an air carrier while not applied against the hijacker. Capital Transit Co. v.
Jackson, 149 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Pickwick V. Stages Corp. v. Messinger,
44 Ariz. 174, 36 P.2d 168 (1934).
"'See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1511 (1976). While generally every citizen has
the public right of transit through navigable airspace, 49 U.S.C. §§ 104, 1304
(1976), the passenger's right to demand air transportation is qualified by the
duty of the air carrier to observe proper safety standards. See, e.g., Aller
v. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc., 4 CAB 113, 117 (1943). An air carrier
must refuse to transport a person who does not consent to a search of his person
and luggage. 14 C.F.R. § 121.538(k) (1980). The fact that a carrier can exclude
a passenger who might be inimical to the safety of the other passengers does
not alter its status as a common carrier. Zizer v. Colonial Western Airway,
2

'2'See

Inc., 162 A. 591 (N.J. Sup. 1932); MCCLINTOCK, supra note 8, at 65; Skyjacking,

supra note 8, at 43 n. 57. See
797 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), holding
to an individual who was a
See also Mason v. Belieu, 543
(1976).

Williams v. Trans World Airways, 369 F. Supp.
that an airline is authorized to refuse transport
fugitive from justice and considered dangerous.
F.2d 215 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852
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or that will free passengers from all possible dangers.'

The air-

line may be bound only to undertake action which is "practicable"" or that is "compatible with the normal prosecution of its
business....0 Hence, if the minimum prescribed security measures

and screening devices are the fullest extent of what is practicable
for a particular airline, then the fact that an offender is able to
circumvent the screening system employed, 1' or that screening
devices that are developed do not have the capabilities to detect
certain types of weapons or explosives," may not render the air-

line negligent.
There are indications that the mechanisms presently utilized for
screening passengers and their carry-on items are effective and that
any breakdowns in the system are due primarily to the carelessness
of personnel at passenger screening checkpoints." ' As previously
noted, since 100 percent screening was instituted in January, 1973,

only one firearm has been carried by a skyjacker through a screening station."' Although knives or other weapons (not firearms or
explosives) were employed in seven attempted hijackings since
January, 19 7 3 ,"n knives are capable of being discovered on a

would-be passenger's person by the metal detector' and in the
passenger's carry-on luggage by the x-ray machine." ' Furthermore,
the x-ray machines in current use have the capacity to permit detection of explosives carried in luggage."* Therefore, screening
See Kasanof v. Embry-Riddle Co., 26 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1946).
Orr v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 349 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 1977).
" Virginia v. United Airlines, 248 S.E.2d 124, 130 (Va. 1978).
1 See notes 51, 52 supra, and accompanying text.
:rThe weapon detectors designed to react to metal fail to detect nonmetallic weapons, such as explosives, acids, plastic, or glass. See McGINLEY, supra
note 30, at 314.
" FAA officials have pointed to human error as the primary reason for
security slip-ups. See ARFY, supra note 10, at 270; Blumenthal, supra note 30.
The converse is not true, i.e., the carrier may not be absolved from liability
by ineffective screening mechanisms if more sophisticated devices are available.
'3 See note 14 supra, and accompanying text.
"See note 47 supra, and accompanying text.
IwSee United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39 (8th Cir. 1975).
"'7 See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 5.
1
nSee CLYNE, supra note 40, at 129; Barrett, supra note 55, at 502. With
the exception of the gasoline recently smuggled aboard four U.S. airliners,
see note 14 supra, no high explosive device has penetrated the pre-flight passenger screening system since the system's implementation. Five explosive or
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mechanisms in current use will probably detect most instrumentalities intended to effectuate skyjackings if those devices are properly
employed at pre-boarding check points.
Nevertheless, even if it were to be conceded that the screening
mechanisms presently deployed are less than adequate to meet the
newly rising threat of hijackings and related crimes, it has been held
that an air carrier has the "duty to exercise such means as were
available to it to avoid or minimize the danger to its passengers,' 3 9
and that "[a] failure to do anything which could have been done
. . .to prevent the injury renders the carrier liable.' '.. The fact
that an air carrier has complied with FAA regulations will not
absolve it of negligence if the high standard of care would require
greater precautionary measures."' There are four new types of
explosive detection mechanisms that have recently completed development or are in the final stages of evaluation."'4 The FAA has
made specially-trained explosive detection dog teams available to
airlines at twenty-nine airports across the country.' It has been
proposed that all embarking passengers be submitted to the "sniffer"'" dog test in addition to the metal-detecting device to prevent
explosives from being carried onto aircraft on the persons of skyjackers.' Screening of checked luggage has also been advocated
to reduce the possibility that bombs will be smuggled aboard aircraft in that manner.'" Hence, a plaintiff-passenger may be able to
incendiary devices were detected at screening stations in 1977, three in 1978,
and three during the first half of 1979. See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 1,

28 (Exhibit 9).
' Ness v. West Coast Airlines, 90 Idaho 111, 410 P.2d 965, 968 (1965).
140
Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 1959).
'4'See,

e.g., Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.D.

1966).
basic characteristics of the devices are x-ray absorption, thermal
'4'The
neutron activation, nuclear magnetic resonance, and vapor characterization. See
1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 34 (Exhibit 15).

1d. at 12. In recent evaluations, the "K-9" teams maintained a level of
'
explosive detection surety of approximately 98% and a false alert rate of about
4%. Id.
4 See CLYNE, supra note 40, at 174.
4

1

Id.

141Id. at 128. Eight explosive devices were discovered on board commercial

aircraft during the 6 -year period between January 1, 1973 and June 30, 1979.

1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 26 (Exhibit 7). Although an air carrier is
required to submit an acceptable plan to the FAA designed in part to prevent
"the carriage of any explosive or incendiary device in checked baggage," see
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establish a breach of the air carrier's duty to detect weapons and
explosives, despite the deficiencies of the particular devices or
measures utilized by the airline, by showing that more sophisticated
mechanisms or more reliable procedures were available to the
airline.' 7 If the air carrier in the exercise of its high degree of
care could not have prevented a particular strategem employed by
an offender to get weapons or explosives on board an aircraft, then
there was no breach of duty, no negligence, and, at least in the
context of a domestic flight, no liability on the part of the air
carrier.
The high duty of care imposed on air carriers may require the
deployment of armed security guards at screening check points,
boarding areas, and/or aboard the aircraft. Such actions might
be necessary to prevent a potential hijacker from forcing his way
way through or around passenger screening stations and onto waiting aircraft,'" and to satisfy the airline's duty to exercise all available means to minimize danger to its passengers in some jurisdictions " ' or to exercise all means practicable in other jurisdictions."' Current federal regulations as put forth by the FAA require
only that an airline "as part of its security program, provide for law
enforcement support . . . to assist passenger screening operations" for flights at certain airports which are not required to maintain security forces."' It has been held that a common carrier normally has no duty to provide armed guards to protect its passengers."' A carrier is not required to furnish a security force sufficient
to prevent all violence or danger posed by other passengers or
strangers when such threats are not reasonably expected." On
14 C.F.R. § 121.538(b) (1980), air carriers are not currently required to
screen checked luggage. They are required to prevent unauthorized cargo and
baggage from being loaded aboard aircraft. See 14 C.F.R. § 121.538(c)(3)
(1980).
147An

assumption is made that some screening devices may be better and

some security measures safer or more reliable than those minimally required

by the FAA.
.48 See note 48 supra, and accompanying text.
149 See, e.g., Ness v. West Coast Airlines, 90 Idaho 111, 410 P.2d 965, 968

(1965).
"Orr v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 349 So. 2d 417, 419 (La. App. 1977).
"' See 14 C.F.R. § 121.538(1) (1980). See also 14 C.F.R. 5 107.13(b) (1980).

"'Higgins v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 347 So. 2d 944, 946 (La. App.
1977).
" Dilley v. Baltimore Transit Co., 39 A.2d 469 (Md. C.A. 1944).
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the other hand, a carrier is required to furnish a force of security
guards sufficient to protect its passengers from foreseeable assaults
by other passengers or strangers." ' Nevertheless, the fact that a
carrier has taken such steps to increase security is not enough to
preclude its liability as a matter of law." In light of the carrier's
high standard of care, it may be held liable for injuries to passengers resulting from the negligence of law enforcement officers
hired by the carrier where the officer's negligence constituted a
breach of the carrier's duty to protect its passengers."' In independent contractor cases, the general rule of tort law is that one who
employs an independent contractor is not liable for the negligent
conduct of the latter, even if the independent contractor's negligence occurs while it is acting within the scope of the contract." '
However, an exception to this no-liability rule is recognized in the
context of non-delegable duties. If the obligor's duty is nondelegable as a matter of law, e.g., where the specific obligation is
imposed upon the specific party, or its class, by statute, the employer cannot relieve himself from liability by hiring an independent contractor to perform the obligation."' In Quigley v. Wilson
Line of Massachusetts,"' where the defendant carrier employed
security officers to patrol its station to deter criminal activity, the
court declared that "[e]ven if the hired police officers . . .were
acting as independent contractors . . . the defendant common
carrier was not thereby relieved from its liability for the negligence
of those officers in not adequately protecting the plaintiff against a
foreseeable risk."'
A very significant issue that may arise in hijacking-related suits
for damages by passengers against air carriers is the question of
the liability of airlines for the emotional injuries suffered by pas154Id.

15 See Kenny v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 587 F.2d 351, 354 (3d Cir.
1978).
"' Quigley v. Wilson Line of Mass., 338 Mass. 125, 154 N.E.2d 77, 80 (1958).
"s See generally PROSSER, supra note 69, § 71 at 468.
"' See, e.g., Chicago, K. & W. R.R. v. Hutchinson, 25 P. 576 (Kansas 1891);
Snyder v. Southern Cal Edison Co., 44 Cal.2d 793, 285 P.2d 912 (1955).
"'1338 Mass. 125, 154 N.E.2d 77 (1958).
1) Id. at 80. It has been held that the duty of a carrier to transport its passengers in safety is non-delegable. Eli v. Murphy, 39 Cal. 2d 598, 248 P.2d 756
(1952).
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sengers resulting from hijackings in which the skyjacker who
claims possession of a bomb, or wields a toy pistol that appears
to be real, but is in fact not armed. This question is particularly
relevant since the implementation of a pre-boarding screening
system, applicable to all passengers and their carry-on items,

has proven highly effective in preventing firearms and explosive
devices from being carried aboard commercial aircraft.'' Since

January 1, 1973, there have been at least thirty-two U.S. hijacking incidents in which the hijacker passed through normal screening procedures.1"' Of these thirty-two, twenty-one involved unarmed
skyjackers who, once aboard, feigned possession of a weapon or
explosive device."" An issue antecedent to the problem of damages

is whether there is a breach of a duty owed in a case where an unarmed skyjacker seizes control of an air carrier by claiming possession of an explosive device or weapon and threatens to kill
someone on board or detonate the explosive device if his demands
are not met.'" Even if it can be concluded that an air carrier's duty
to exercise a high degree of care to protect its passengers from
hijackings and similar crimes imposes upon it the obligation to
prevent weapons and explosive devices from being taken aboard
its aircraft, it does not necessarily follow that all hijackings manifest a breach of this duty. Exercising "extraordinary care and diligence" 1" may not prevent a hijacking in which the offender forces
I' According to the FAA, only one firearm and no explosive device has penetrated the pre-flight screening system since the system's institution in January,
1973. See note 14 supra, and accompanying text.
1 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 1; see also notes 9 and 13 supra, and
hijackings cited therein.
63 1d.
'64At least three seizures of American commercial airliners this year have
involved such circumstances. See Miami Herald, Aug. 17, 1980, at 1, col. 5;
Wash. Post, Aug. 11, 1980, at 11, col. 5; Wash. Post, July 13, 1980, at 6, col. 2.
Six such incidents occurred in 1979. See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 2-4;
see also note 13 supra, and hijackings cited therein. Two other hijacking incidents on U.S. air carriers in 1979 involved skyjackers who threatened to destroy
the aircraft they were on with explosives or incendiary devices that they did
not actually possess. One had in his possession a pocket knife, the other wielded
a bottle of rum. See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 2-4. The question as
to which a passenger on a hijacked airliner can recover for emotional or
mental damages in a negligence action against the airline is discussed infra, at
notes 217-36 and accompanying text.
'Yellow
Cab Co. of Atlanta v. Carmichael, 33 Ga. App. 364, 368, 126
S.E. 269, 271 (1925).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

his way through the screening station with weapon drawn. The
same would seem to be true in the context of an unarmed skyjacker where no amount of pre-flight searching would necessarily
prevent the crime."'
On the other hand, an argument could be made that the proper
use of the hijacker behavioral profile could detect these "bluffartists""' who are nonetheless hijackers despite the fact that they
possess no real weapon. Furthermore, although the metal detector
may not be activiated by a toy pistol or an artificial explosive device, the x-ray machine or a thorough physical search could
discover such items. Of course, these latter measures would not
be effective against a potential hijacker who does not even possess
a simulated weapon or device. Nevertheless, it is plainly not ridiculous to consider that an air carrier, in the exercise of a high degree
of care, could detect potential skyjackers and therefore prevent
skyjackings perpetrated by those who carry no weapon or explosive on board the aircraft with them.
(2) Protective Measures after Boarding
The carrier's duty to exercise a high degree of care to protect
its passengers is obviously not limited in its applicability to the
measures utilized by the airline to prevent passengers from boarding its aircraft with weapons or explosive devices. The high standard of care also defines the scope of the air carrier's obligation to
its passengers after everyone has boarded and while the aircraft
is in flight. The carrier may be "required to exercise the 'highest
degree of care, foresight, prudence, and diligence reasonably demanded at any time by the conditions or circumstances then affecting the passenger and the carrier.' ,..It is necessary, therefore,
to donate some attention to the conduct or actions taken by airline personnel during the course of a skyjacking or similar crime.
Of course, if an air carrier is found to be negligent for allowing
the hijacking to occur in the first instance, e.g., by permitting a
weapon to penetrate the screening system, then the exercise of even
extraordinary care by the airlines during the course of the crime
" See CLYNE, supra note 40, at 121.
Id.

147

'~'Whitman v. Red Top Sedan Service, Inc., 218 So. 2d 213, 216 (Fla. App.

1969).
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would not absolve its liability for the initial negligence. In this
regard, it should be noted that a pilot in command is given wide
discretion in an emergency situation to make decisions and take
whatever action he deems necessary under the circumstances."'
Under the doctrine of sudden emergency, the pilot of an air
carrier is not required by law to exercise a higher standard of
care than "ordinary care"--that of a reasonably prudent man
under similar circumstances."' Thus, a pilot or a crew member
generally is not chargeable with negligence, and an airline is not
liable, if he acts in an emergency situation according to his best
judgment even if, in retrospect, his actions were not the most
reasonable. 1 or constituted an error in judgment, so long as the
error was not positive negligence."' However, if the situation of
emergency arises because of the negligence of the airline or one
of its employees, e.g., where an armed hijacker slips through a
screening checkpoint undetected, the doctrine of sudden emergency is inapplicable and the airline's liability is not shielded by
the circumstances of imminent danger."'
Additionally, in Downs v. United States," it was held that the
extent to which "an actor will be excused for errors in judgment
under [emergency] circumstances, is qualified by the training and
experience he may have, or be expected to have, in coping with
the danger or emergency with which he is confronted.'' In Downs
survivors of two victims of an aircraft hijacking brought suit against
the United States alleging that the negligent handling of the situation provoked the hijacker to kill his hostages. The court decided
that where one trained to handle dangerous situations, as was the
F.B.I. agent in that case, is required "to make a judgment which
may result in the death of innocent persons, he is required to
...
See 14 C.F.R. § 121.557(a) (1980).
1ThMCCLINTOCK, supra note 8, at 74; contra, Massato v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 71 N.J. Super. 39, 176 A.2d 280, 284 (1961)
(carrier's

duty of high care is not diminished in case of sudden emergency).
171See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 194 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 821 (1952).
172 See, e.g., Jackson v. Stancil,
116 S.E.2d 817 (N.C. 1960); Murphy v.
Neely, 179 A. 439 (Pa. 1935).
7' See, e.g., Jackson v. Stancil, 116 S.E.2d 817 (N.C. 1960).
174 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975).
"' Id. at 1002.
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exercise the highest degree of care commensurate with all facts
within his knowledge. 1.. Because U.S. airline flight crews are required to take part in an FAA program to learn in-flight and

ground antihijack procedures and antihijack defensive tactics,1"
the standard articulated in Downs may provide a second limitation
on the sudden emergency doctrine as it is applicable to airline
personnel during a hijacking incident.

It has been suggested that an air carrier may be negligent for
failing to resist the hijacker, i.e., for passively acquiescing to the
offender's demands."' It is conceded that there may arise circumstances where it would not be consistent with the air carrier's high
duty of care to automatically accede to the dictates of a skyjacker,

e.g., where the airline personnel know or should know that he is
not armed.1 ' It is conceded further that there is case law to sup6Id. at 1003.
'"See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 13; Blumenthal, supra note 30.
1" See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 8, at 70. For the air carrier's employees to

assume that a hijacker is in fact armed with a dangerous weapon or explosive
device is tantamount to an assumption that the airline has been negligent in
allowing the hijacker to penetrate the screening system. Although it may seem
inequitable that an air carrier should escape liability by assuming its own
negligence, this is an argument for imposition of strict liability. In light of the
grave risk, that of the loss of a large number of lives, it would not seem unreasonable to accede to demand of a skyjacker who may very well possess a bomb.
So long as the [airline] industry, our government and the vast
majority of people in our country place the value of human life
over property, there can be no certain and final solution to the
skyjacking problem . . . . Short of playing Russian roulette with
each psychotic hijacker, we must deal with each problem as it
arises, within certain acceptable parameters.
Mauer, supra note 30, at 380.
179 Perhaps an airline's employees should be required to demand some proof
from the skyjacker that he is in fact in possession of a dangerous weapon or
explosive device. The purpose of such a requirement would be to detect those
would-be hijackers who do not even possess a simulated weapon or bomb. Six
of the ten attempted hijackings perpetrated aboard U.S. air carriers in 1979
involved hijackers who claimed to possess an explosive or incendiary device.
Five of these hijackers had nothing even resembling such a device in their possession, yet two succeeded in diverting airliners out of the United States. See
1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 2-4; see also notes 9 and 13 supra, and
hijackings cited therein. One recent hijacker successfully forced an Air Florida
jetliner to Cuba by claiming a bar of soap in a box was a bomb. Wash. Post,
Aug. 11, 1980, at 11, col. 5.
It is also arguable that just because the skyjacker possesses some weapon
does not necessarily mean that he should not be resisted. For instance, would it
be reasonable for an air carrier to divert its passengers to a distant region of
the globe because of the demands of a hijacker armed only with a nail file or
a bottle of rum? Two attempted hijackings in 1979 involved these respective
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port the position that a person has no duty to his business invitees

to acquiesce to the criminal demands of a third party intruder in
order to protect the business invitee from physical harm or death. 8 '

However, to acknowledge that there may be no duty to acquiesce
is distinguished from asserting that it constitutes negligence to

acquiesce. Furthermore, it is submitted that any cases holding
that a businessman need not accede to the criminal demands of
an intruder in order to save the lives of business invitees, do not
arise out of the special legal relationship between the common
carrier and its passengers. 8 ' Moreover, the contention that an air

carrier is negligent where it acquiesces to the demands of a hijacker
is inconsistent with the general principle of law that a common
carrier must always choose the course of action least likely to
expose its passengers to harm. 8 In Downs v. United States,"' the
court ruled that a person trained to handle dangerous situations

is "under a duty in a hijacking situation, to choose a course of
action which would maximize the hostages' safety and to attempt
a capture of the hijacker only if possible by means compatible with
circumstances. In the former case the would-be hijacker was apprehended by
FBI agents when the aircraft landed on a scheduled stop. In the latter case, the
offender was overpowered by crewmen and passengers while the aircraft was
in flight. See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 3-4.
"'See, e.g., Boyd v. Racine Currency Exch., Inc., 56 Ill. 2d 95, 306 N.E.2d
39 (1973); Noll v. Martan, 347 Pa. 213, 32 A.2d 18 (1943); contra, Genovay
v. Fox, 50 N.J. Super. 538, 143 A.2d 229, rev'd on other grounds, 29 N.J.
436, 149 A.2d 212 (1959); Sinn v. Farmers Deposit Savings Bank, 300 Pa. 85,
150 A. 163 (1930); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 75, 83
(1965), which state the principle that a person defending himself or his property may be liable for harm to third persons if his acts create an unreasonable
risk of harm to such persons.
18 In Boyd v. Racine Currency Exch., Inc., 56 Ill.
2d 95, 306 N.E.2d 39
(1973), a wrongful death action was brought by the widow of a customer killed
by an armed robber when a teller at a currency exchange refused to comply
with his demands for money even though the robber threatened to kill the
customer if his demands were not met. The court found no duty to accede to
the robber's demands. Id.
182See,
e.g., Spalt v. Eaton, 118 N.J.L. 327, 192 A. 576, 578 (1937);
Harpell v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 20 N.J. 309, 120 A.2d 43, 47 (1956).
This rule may be limited by holdings in other cases to the effect that common
carriers owe their passengers the "highest degree of care consistent with the
practical operation of the plane." Southeastern Aviation v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639,
355 S.W.2d 436, 446 (1962). Thus, an air carrier may be justified, despite a
hijacker's demands, in refusing transport to Iran if the aircraft were incapable of
transoceanic flight.
183 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975).
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the greater interest .... ITihe means employed to effect any capture should be consonant with that which would provide the maxi-

mum assurance possible that hostages would not be harmed as a
result."'" Applying this standard, the F.B.I. agent was held to have
been negligent for choosing to use force when there did exist "a
better-suited alternative to protecting the hostages' well-being. That

choice was not to intervene forcibly but to continue the 'waiting
game.' t"8
Hence, unless some opportunity presents itself that would allow
for the hijacker to be subdued without exposing the passengers to

a greater risk of danger, it would seem that most circumstances
surrounding an air hijacking or related incident would suggest that
acquiescence to the hijacker's demands would constitute the course
of action least likely to expose its passengers to danger. It has been

held that a carrier has no obligation to physically intervene in an
assault on one passenger by another.' If an airline's employees
take action to physically overpower a hijacker, although they are
privileged to do so, the airline may be held to be negligent if its
other passengers are exposed to harm," " and it will be liable for
any injuries incurred by innocent passengers.'"
I"Id. at 1001-02.
193 Id. at 1002. While the Downs court announced that a "waiting-game" is
preferable to use of force in a hijacking situation, it left open the question of
whether, in a case where a "waiting game" is not an option, full acquiescence
to the hijacker's demands is preferable to use of force.
18' See, e.g., Higgins v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 347 So. 2d 944, 946
(La. App. 1977).
187See, e.g., Watson v. Chicago Transit Auth., 52 Il1. 2d 503, 288 N.E.2d
476, 478 (1972); Spalt v. Eaton, 118 N.J.L. 327, 192 A. 576, 578 (1937). This
reasoning would probably not apply to an incident where a bomb has been
placed on an air carrier. In such case, the carrier's duty to protect its passengers would require the carrier to act to inspect any package that it reasonably
believes to contain explosives. See State v. Morris, 42 Ohio St. 2d 307, 329 N.E.2d
85, 93-94 n. 1 (1975).
188See Miller v. Mills, 257 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. 1953). Where one undertakes an
act which he has no duty to perform, the act generally must be performed with
ordinary care. Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th
Cir. 1955). Of the ten skyjacking incidents involving U.S. air carriers in 1979,
seven were thwarted when the hijacker was physically subdued, five times by
F.B.I. agents or police and twice by airline personnel with the assistance of
passengers. One hijacker was shot and killed by Sidney, Australia, policemen.
See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 2-4; see note 13 supra, and hijackings
cited therein.

1980]

COMMENTS

B. Proximate Cause
Assuming that a plaintiff-passenger can establish that by its
actions or omissions the airline has breached a duty owed to the
passenger, before liability can be imposed it must be shown that
the air carrier's negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries incurred by the plaintiff-passenger. The basic issue in
this regard is whether the hijacker's criminal acts break the
chain of causation so completely as to supercede the air carrier's
negligence as the proximate cause of the injury to the passenger.'
The general rule is that because a common carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers, it is not responsible for the
consequences of felonious acts perpetrated by persons not in its
employ nor under its control,'" even if the carrier's negligence has
created a condition which serves to facilitate the subsequent independent criminal acts of the third persons."' However, the subsequent criminal act of a third person does not automatically relieve the party that is guilty of an earlier negligent or wrongful
act from responsibility. The general exception to the aforementioned rule is that "the subsequent independent act, in order to
break the causal connection, must be one, the intervention of
which was not probable or foreseeable by the first wrongdoer....
[W]hen the intervening cause of an injury is of such nature as could
reasonably have been anticipated .... the earlier negligent act, if
it contributed to the injuries may be regarded as the proximate
9
cause.' 2
As stated in section 448 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or
crime is a superceding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct created a situation
which afforded an opportunity to the third person to commit such
a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a
See generally PROSSER, supra note 69, 5 44, at 270.
'"See, e.g., Wing Hang Bank, Ltd. v. Japan Air Lines Co., 357 F. Supp. 94

(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Terre Haute, Indianapolis and E. Traction Co. v. Scott, 197
Ind. 587, 150 N.E. 777 (1926).

366, 50 N.E.2d 497, 503 (1943).
"I Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 383 Ill.
50 N.E.2d at 503-04; Werndli v. Greyhound Corp., 465 So. 2d 177, 178
n. I (Fla. App. 1978); Kenny v. Southeastern Pa. Transp., 581 F.2d 351 (3rd Cir.
1978); see PROSSER, supra note 69, § 44, at 272-75.
1"2
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situation might be created, and that a third person might avail
himself of the opportunity to commit, such a tort or crime."'
Once it has been determined that it is an air carrier's duty to anticipate and guard against hijackings and similar crimes, and this
duty is breached, it follows that the occurrence of the very incident that the airline was under a duty to prevent will not supercede
the airline's liability. 1 " The point that air carriers are bound by their
high standard of care to anticipate and to guard against potential
hijackings and related crimes has been made previously in this
article.'" Moreover, as has also been noted, Congress has expressly
placed upon the airlines the duty to screen all passengers and their
carry-on items for weapons and explosives to protect passengers
and their property against acts of criminal violence and aircraft
piracy.' It is submitted, therefore, that an airline may be held
liable for injuries suffered by its passengers during a skyjacking,
or similar crime, because by its failure to adequately screen the
potential hijacker prior to boarding, the air carrier has made a
substantial contribution to those injuries even though the injuries
would not have occurred but for the hijacker's acts.19 '
On the other hand, the injuries for which a plaintiff-passenger
seeks compensation must not be too remote. In National Airlines,
9
a passenger on an American airliner that was
Inc. v. Edwards,""
hijacked to Cuba brought suit against the air carrier to recover
for illness and injuries, which resulted in mental and physical disability and loss of wage earning capacity, that the passenger
allegedly sustained as a result of being forced to consume Cuban
food and drink."" The Florida Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, and reinstated an order of dismissal rendered by the trial
court, on the grounds that the damages alleged to be the result of
the airline's negligence were too remote as a matter of law in that
"
14
"

9

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS S

448 (1965).

Prosser, supra note 69, § 44, at 275.
See notes 83-100 and accompanying text.

19049

U.S.C. § 1357 (1976).

197PROSSER, supra note 69, S 44, at 273.

" 336 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1976).

I9'
Id. at 545-46. The plaintiff apparently had to claim that her injuries resulited in part from the consumption of Cuban food because Florida adheres
to the impact doctrine in claims for damages due to mental and emotional

injuries.
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they were not the natural and probable consequences of the
tortious act and did not ordinarily and naturally flow therefrom.'
(1) ContributoryNegligence
In some states the defense of contributory negligence may be

available to airlines.

1

In such a jurisdiction, a passenger suffering

injuries during a hijacking or similar incident would be unable to

recover if his own negligence proximately contributed to his own
injuries because contributory negligence, where applicable, is a
complete bar to recovery in a case brought in negligence." The

question of whether or not a passenger was contributorily negligent
might arise where a passenger voluntarily acts to subdue a hijacker
and is injured as a result. A plaintiff-passenger who has increased
the risk of harm to himself over what the risk would have been

had he exercised reasonable care may be held to have exculpated
0 On the other hand, courts have held that
a negligent airline."

where a plaintiff is confronted with imminent peril to himself or
to a third person, e.g., another passenger, he may assume extraordinary risks, in attempting to protect himself or a third person

from the danger, without being held contributorily negligent. '"
An application of this rule to the context of airline hijackings
would limit the availability of the contributory negligence defense
for the air carriers.
(2) Assumption of the Risk

One who becomes a passenger on an air carrier engaged in a
I°d. at 446-47. The court cited Taylor Imported Motors, Inc. v. Smiley,
143 So. 2d 66 (Fla. App. 1962) and Kwoka v. Campbell, 296 So. 2d 629 (Fla.
App. 1974) in support of its opinion.
201
See generally PROSSER, supra note 69, § 65, at 416.
'02 See, e.g., La Corn v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 132 Cal. 2d 889, 281 P.2d
894 (1955); State v. Henson Flying Serv., Inc., 60 A.2d 675 (Md. App. 1948).
Cf. Bradfield v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 681, 152 Cal. Rptr.
172 (1979) holding that comparative negligence is available as a defense in actions
based upon the Warsaw Convention. In jurisdictions where comparative negligence is applied, a passenger's conduct may mitigate against his recovery as
opposed to barring recovery.
'o3 See, e.g., Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th

Cir. 1955).
204 See, e.g., Aylor v. Intercounty Construction Corp., 381 F.2d 930 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); Thompson v. Van Wagener, 25 Utah 2d 383, 483 P.2d 427 (1971);
Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871); see generally PROSSER, supra
note 69, § 33 at 168.
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domestic flight normally assumes the risks of those perils incident
to air travel which cannot be averted even by the carrier's exercise
of the highest degree of care.2" In light of this principle, it has
been suggested that an assumption of the risk2 " defense may be
asserted by an air carrier in response to an action for injuries
resulting from a skyjacking incident." ' To establish a defense of
assumption of the risk, a carrier would have to show that the passenger knew of and appreciated the risk of hijacking before contracting for passage."' Thus, the air carrier could probably utilize
such a defense only if a hijacking warning were printed on the
passenger ticket, which is the contract of carriage between the
passenger and carrier. In this way the passenger could be held to
have voluntarily entered into the contract of carriage fully knowing
and appreciating the risk involved, but still electing to encounter
the possible danger by boarding the plane. " Without notice and
warning, the assumption of the risk defense would fail because the
passenger, as one to whom the high duty of care is owed, has a
right to assume that it will be performed and is not required to
anticipate the airline's negligent acts or omissions."' And even if
an airline did have an adequate warning of the hijacking danger
printed on its tickets, making the determination that the risk of
losing passengers is outweighed by the potential liability, any provisions which would exclude or limit liability may be held to be
imposed by adhesion and violative of public policy.211 Furthermore,
2=2

See, e.g., Wilson v. Colonial Air Transp., Inc., 180 N.E. 212 (Mass. 1932).

Cf., Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.

1972)

(brought under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention which provides that the
carrier "shall be liable" for any bodily injuries occuring on international flights).
See Warsaw, supra note 15.
'o See generally PROSSER, supra note 69, S 68, at 439.
2"7 See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 8, at 72.
200 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS, S 496 (1965).
209See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 8, at 73; A TOOTHMAN, LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF SKYJACKING 251, 257 (1969).
210 Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955).
" See Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft v. CAB, 479 F.2d 912 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.),
afl'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S.
455 (1968); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § 575 (1932).
The Warsaw Convention's limitations on air carrier liability are effectuated
through the contract between an airline and its passengers as expressed by the
ticket. See In Re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114 (C.D. Cal.
1978). Article 3(1) of the Warsaw Convention requires that a ticket state that
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courts have recognized that in situations where statutes have been
enacted to protect a particular class of persons against their own
inability to protect themselves, the fundamental purpose of such
statutes would be defeated if a member of the protected class was
allowed to assume the risk. In such cases, courts have generally
held that where a statute has been enacted to protect a particular
class of plaintiffs, they cannot assume the risk of violation of the
statute, either expressly or by implication. 12 Therefore, a plaintiffpassenger who suffers injuries arising out of a skyjacking of a
U.S. carrier in which the hijacker has carried a concealed weapon
or explosive device through the passenger screening station and
aboard the aircraft without detection, may not be held to have
assumed the risk in light of the protective purpose of the legislation, and regulations pursuant thereto, requiring airlines to "prevent or deter the carriage aboard its aircraft of any explosive or
incendiary device or weapon in carry-on baggage or on or about
the persons of passengers. 21. On the other hand, an airline's assumption of the risk defense is more apt to prevail in a case arising out of a hijacking in which the skyjacker was not armed because there would be no violation of statute by the airline in such
a case.
V. COMPENSABLE INJURIES

Since pre-flight screening of all airline passengers and their
carry-on items was implemented in January, 1973, there has been
only one skyjacking attempt aboard a U.S. air carrier which involved a hijacker armed with a firearm that penetrated the screening system. 1" While there have been seven incidents in which some
the transportation is subject to the conventions liability rule, while section (2)
provides that a carrier must deliver a passenger ticket to a passenger if it is to
avail itself of the convention's liability limitations. See Warsaw, supra note 15,
art. 3.
211 See, e.g., Narramore v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 96 F. 298 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 175 U.S. 724 (1899); Suess v. Anouherd Steel Products Co.,
180 Minn. 21, 230 N.W. 125 (1930). See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 496F (1965). Furthermore some jurisdictions have abandoned assumption of the risk as a bar to recovery in negligence cases. See, e.g., Farley v.
M. M. Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975).
21314 C.F.R. § 121.538(b) (1980); 49 U.S.C. §§ 1356-57 (1976).
214 See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 1; see also N.Y. Times, Jan. 27,
1980, at 18, col. 5.
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lesser weapon, e.g., a knife, was not detected by the screening

measures,"' the number of passengers who have actually sustained
direct bodily injuries at the hands of skyjackers on American air-

liners since January, 1973, has been small."' Thus, the question
of whether a passenger on a hijacked, or similarly threatened, airliner can recover from any mental anguish, emotional trauma, nervous shock or fright has become a particularly critical issue since

January, 1973.
There is no question that an innocent passenger could recover

damages for any bodily injuries proximately caused by an airline's
negligence. By contrast, some objections against permitting recovery for negligently inflicted mental distress have been advanced,
among them, that it cannot be measured in terms of money, that

it is too remote, and that increased litigation will result." ' These
objections would seem to have no special application to suits arising

out of airline hijackings. Furthermore, modem courts have largely
dismissed these arguments because "[miental suffering is no more
difficult to estimate in financial terms, and no less a real injury
than 'physical pain'

. . .

. It is the business of the courts to make

precedent where a wrong calls for redress, even if lawsuits must
be multiplied."..." The only valid objection to allowance of recovery

for mental or emotional injury is considered to be the danger of
"ISee note 47 supra, and accompanying text. Additionally, gasoline was
apparently smuggled aboard U.S. airlines in four recent incidents. See note 14
supra.
216
On April 4, 1979, a female hostage received cuts on her throat from the
knife of a would-be hijacker. 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 3. No other
airline passengers sustained bodily injuries in the course of the 28 hijacking
incidents on U.S. air carriers since January, 1978. See 1979 FAA Report, supra
note 11, at 2-4; 2d 1978 FAA Report, supra note 24, at 2-4; 1st 1978 FAA
Report, supra note 24, at 7-8; see also notes 9 and 13 supra, and hijackings
cited therein. On the other hand, between 1974 and June 30, 1979, criminal acts
perpetrated against U.S. civil aviation resulted in a total of 116 deaths and 120
injuries, which of course, include persons other than passengers. 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 9. In addition to claiming bodily injuries and mental
distress, a plaintiff-passenger might seek to recover for lost work time, delay
or substitute travel expenses incurred, loss of business deal or contract, etc.
See MCCLNTOCK, supra note 8, at 57-59; Skyjacking, supra note 8, at 39-40.
However, domestic airlines are able to avoid or limit liability for delays in
completion of flights in accordance with tariffs filed with and approved by the
CAB. 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1976); See also Tompkins, supra note 67, at 388.
21See PROSSER, supra note 69, at 327; Abromovsky, supra note 30, at 348.
218See PROSSER, supra note 69, at 327-28.
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vexatious suits and ficticious claims because mental anguish is
viewed as being easily simulated. 19
One result of these concerns was the development of the "im-

pact" doctrine,"0 the theory being that the presence of physical
"impact" at the time of the incident giving rise to the psychiatric
injury, will insure that the alleged mental distress is legitimate."

Clearly, where as a result of a defendant's negligence the plaintiff
suffers physical injury, courts will order compensation for purely
mental or emotional elements of the accompanying or consequential damage, such as fright at the time of the injury." Moreover, with the recent trend toward the abandonment of the ima plaintiff
pact requirement in a majority of jurisdictions,'
M

219

Id. at 328.

at 331.
'Id. See also Purcell v. St. Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892). With
regard to claims for damages due to mental anguish and emotional trauma suffered during hijackings of international flights, see Burnett v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1156-57 (D.N.M. 1973) where it was held
that mental anguish alone is not compensable under the Warsaw system's provision that the air carrier shall be liable for bodily injuries received by its
passengers. However, the court also decided that an injured passenger could
recover bodily injuries even though not caused by physical contact and that
"emotional distress . . . directly precipitated by bodily injury [is] considered as
a part of the bodily injury itself" for which damages are recoverable. Id. at
1158. It was similarly held in Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d
385, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97, 314 N.E.2d 848 (1974), that an airline is liable under the
Warsaw system for "palpable, objective bodily injuries including those caused by
the psychic trauma of the hijacking, and for damages flowing from those bodily
injuries [including mental suffering], but not for the trauma as such or for the
non-bodily or behavioral manifestations of that trauma." 358 N.Y.S.2d at 110,
314 N.E.2d at 857.
Contrastingly, the more recent decision of Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) and Krystal v.
British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322, 1323 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
have followed Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1250-51
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) in holding that mental injuries suffered by passengers during
international skyjackings are compensable under the Warsaw system, even
though not precipitated by bodily injuries, if the otherwise applicable substantive
law provides an applicable cause of action.
22See, e.g., Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. McBride, 36 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1930);
Steitz v. Gifford, 280 N.Y. 15, 19 N.E.2d 661 (1939).
'223 PROSSER, supra note 69, at 332. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
313 (1965). The reason for the retreat from the impact requirement was expressed
in Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729, 740-42
(1961):
It is fundamental to our common-law system that one may seek
redress for every substantial wrong ....
In many instances, just as
in impact cases, there will be no doubt as to the presence and
2Id.
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generally may recover for mental and emotional injuries suffered
as a result of another's negligence, even where there has been no
physical impact, if the party seeking recovery was subjected to
fear of physical injury as a direct result of the tortious conduct."
It has been held that there may even be recovery for mental or
emotional suffering in the absence of the fear of potential physical
injury to the person directly subjected to the negligent act of
another, provided that the psychic injury is genuine, substantial,
and proximately caused by the defendant's negligence." In Kalish
v. Trans World Airlines,"' an airline passenger was held entitled to recover for emotional injuries incurred when she was
allegedly trampled by other passengers who were trapped in a
burning aircraft." The court held that due to the circumstances of
the case, the plaintiff-passenger was not required to prove physical
impact:
[A]ny person in plaintiff's predicament would anticipate and be
terrified, on a sustained basis, by the possibility of suffering
very serious injury or death while a captive in a burning aircraft.
Such anticipation, anxiety and anguish would not be suffered in
split-seconds, but over a prolonged period of twenty minutes or
more which heightened plaintiff's natural horror and the consequential psychic traumatic effects of the situation. Each second
was an eternity. This was . . . a real life terror-in-the-sky emergency which, undoubtedly, had an overwhelming, engulfing, terrorstricken impact on plaintiff as a captive passenger ....
The obviextent of the damage and the fact that it was proximately caused
by defendant's negligence. In the difficult cases, we must look to
the quality and genuineness of proof, and rely to an extent on
the contemporary sophistication of the medical profession and
the ability of the court and jury to weed out the dishonest claims.
Claimant should, therefore, be given an opportunity to prove that
her injuries were proximately caused by defendant's negligence.
224 See, e.g., Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d
729 (1961).
'2 Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 383-84, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 642-43, 334
N.E.2d 590, 593 (1975); but see Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215 (6th Cir.),
cert denied, 429 U.S. 852 (1976) (wife held not entitled to recover for mental
distress suffered when airline prevented husband from boarding scheduled flight
despite airline's failure to give wife valid explanation when husband did not
arrive on flight) and Cohen v. Varig Airlines, 62 A.D.2d 234, 405 N.Y.S.2d 44,
49-50 (1978) (plaintiffs were held not entitled to recover for alleged mental
and emotional suffering due to lost luggage).
220 89 Misc. 2d 153, 390 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1977).
227 390 N.Y.S.2d at 1008-09.
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ous mental anguish which all passengers including plaintiff must
have suffered over their possibility of being destroyed in a crash
or by an explosion in mid-air beggars [sic] normal imagination
unless one has actually been the victim of such events. This court
concludes that the assault against the plaintiff's emotional senses
of these circumstances was so pervasive as to be tantamount to

the infliction of physical blows upon her body, and was the same
as if she had suffered additional, actual bodily injuries.'
The reasoning of the court in Kalish is very easily applicable
to an air carrier hijacking case which is also a "terror-in-the-sky
emergency" such that it is "obvious" that passengers would suffer
mental anguish and anxiety over the possibility of being destroyed
in a crash or by an explosion in mid-air. Under Kalish and other
similar cases, a passenger on an air carrier that is hijacked may
recover, inter alia, for any mental anguish, emotional trauma,
nervous shock, and fright even without proof of physical injury
or impact in a jurisdiction that does not adhere to the "impact"
rule.
Furthermore, because courts have determined "impact" to be
sufficient in minor contacts with the person that could not be
responsible for the real injury, a plaintiff-passenger may be able
to recover for mental and emotional injuries arising out of skyjackings and related crimes even in jurisdictions which follow the
"impact" rule. Sufficient impact has been found in a slight blow,2"'
a trivial jolt or jar,"' a forcible seating,"' inhalation of smoke,"'
and a fall caused by fainting." Moreover, it has been held that
"shocks to the nerves' and nervous system" by itself constitutes
physical harm that is enough to satisfy the requirement of impact."'
Nevertheless, in the absence of an application of the rule in
22aId. at 1011.

2 Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R., 172 Mass. 488, 52 N.E. 747 (1898).
2"'Zelinsky v. Chimes, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961) ("any degree of physical impact, however slight"); Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat of
Kennewick, Inc., 60 Wash. 2d 468, 374 P.2d 549 (1962) (shock explosion);
see Boston v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co., 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.2d 326 (1945).
niDriscoll v. Gaffey, 207 Mass. 109, 92 N.E. 1010 (1910).
22 Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930).
2
Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931).
"4See Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115
(1967) which allowed recovery for fright due to the negligent operation of
the airliner.
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Kalish that the circumstances of the injury provide a sufficient

guarantee that the claim for mental anguish is genuine, most courts
will require evidence of physical consequences or manifestations
of the psychiatric injury before damages will be awarded. ' In a
jurisdiction that follows the impact doctrine, some physical contact, however slight, will be required before recovery for mental
distress will be allowed."
Because of the divergent position assumed by numerous states
on the issue of compensation for persons suffering mental or emotional injuries, the determination of choice of law questions may be

dispositive of current and future suits by passengers of air carriers
for injuries resulting from skyjackings"
VI.

'

CONFLICT OF LAWS

For choice of law purposes, the ideal case would involve a
plaintiff-passenger and defendant airline who are both domiciled
in the state in which the hijacker boarded and the plaintiff's injury occurred. In such a case there probably would be no doubt
as to which state's substantive law would apply. Should a domestic
hijacking result in litigation, however, it is not unlikely that the
case would involve a passenger and airline with different domiciles,
and a situation where the hijacker boarded the aircraft in one
state and the passenger suffered injury in another state. 3'
State substantive laws applicable to a passenger's suit for damages arising out of a hijacking of a domestic commercial airliner
2See, e.g., Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965);
Daley v. La Croix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970). Accord, Wallace v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 313 (1965).
'In
Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.H.
1973) the court rejected an argument that the hijacking itself and the subsequent division of the aircraft constituted bodily injury in spite of the fact that
the abduction of the passengers was apparently an actionable interference with
the person of the passenger. Id. at 1158.
"The assumption is made that bodily injuries to airline passengers on hijacked U.S. flights will be the exception and not the rule.
"I In the January, 1980 Delta hijacking, the Atlanta-based air carrier was flying from Los Angeles, California to New York City with passengers boarding in
Los Angeles, Dallas, Texas and Atlanta, Georgia, when it was hijacked while in
North Carolina's air space. The hijacker smuggled the handgun aboard the aircraft in Atlanta, Georgia. Dallas Morning News, Jan. 26, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
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may conflict on several issues in addition to whether persons who
have suffered mental or emotional injuries will be compensated:
the interpretation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; the duty of

care owed by air carriers to their passengers; and whether contributory negligence and/or assumption of the risk may be asserted by the air carrier in order to bar the injured passenger's
recovery. States even disagree on the choice of law rule that is to be
utilized in order to determine the state law that is applicable to

the merits of the case." 9 Three frequently employed conflicts
theories are: (1) lex loci delicti, in which the court applies the

law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred;"0 (2) "significant
contacts," which calls for a determination of which state has the
most significant relationship to the issue;-, (3) "government interest," under which the court compares the law of the state involved
and the interests of the litigants to determine the law most
"appropriately" applicable to the subject issue.' In this regard,
the former strict lex loci delicti, "place of injury," rule has largely
been abandoned in favor of one of the more flexible rules which
permit analysis of the policies and interests underlying the par4
ticular issue before the court."'
In the frequently cited case of
23 See generally Douglas, Air Disaster Litigation Without Diversity, 45 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 411, 424 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Douglas].
'' Id. at 425. The court may look to the place of injury, In re Air Crash
Disaster at Boston Mass. on July 31, 1973, 39 F. Supp. 1106, 1115 (D. Mass.
1975), or to the state where the tortious act occurred. Manos v. TWA, Inc.,
295 F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
41 Douglas, supra note 239, at 425. Section 146 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS provides:
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where
the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state
has a more significant relationship . . . with the occurrence and the
parties, in which event the local law of the other state will govern.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS S 146 (1971).Cf. RESTATE-

MENT OF CONFLICTS

OF LAWS

§ 378 (1934)

which stated: "The law of the

place of the wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury." Id.
m~"
Douglas, supra note 239, at 425. See In Re Paris Air Crash of March 3,
1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
2'3 See, e.g., Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 469, 473 (4th Cir. 1973); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796, 805 (1964); see also George v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,
332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964); Pearson v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963);
Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957); Kilberg
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Babcock v. Jackson,' the court concluded that "[j]ustice, fairness
and the 'best practical result' . . .may best be achieved by giving
controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of
its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has
the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation." The United States Supreme Court has indicated apparent
approval of the trend to depart from the "place of the injury" rule
in order to give consideration to the extent of the interests of the
states having contacts with the legal issue and with the parties.'
It is submitted that in a suit brought by a passenger who seeks
recovery from an airline for injuries received during a domestic
skyjacking carried out by a hijacker who succeeded in smuggling
a weapon or explosive device aboard, the liability of the airline
should normally be resolved by the law of state where the hijacker
boarded the aircraft even though the actual injuries may have
been sustained while the airliner was within the territorial auspices
of another state. This rule would avoid having to deal with the
problem of determining over which state's territory the passenger's
injury occurred, a problem that would be particularly troublesome
in the case of alleged mental or emotional distress because the injury may result from the entire traumatic event which could encompass flight over several states. Furthermore, application of the
law of the state where the hijacker penetrated the screening system is consistent with the rule that whether a person has been
negligent is normally determined by reference to the law of the
state where he acted and the standards of conduct in existence
there." Moreover, an analysis of the policies and interests of the
respective states with regard to hijackings and their prevention
would favor application of the law of the state where the hijacker
smuggled his weapon past the pre-flight screening checkpoint. Fedv. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526
(1961).
244 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).

'ld. at 481, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749, 191 N.E.2d at 283.
21 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). The law of the place where

the act or omission occurred was applied even though the injury occurred in
another
state. Id. at 12-13.
241
See H. GOODRICH, CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 94, at 173 (4th ed. 1964). Cf.
Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950); Farmer v.
Standard Dredging Corp., 167 F. Supp. 381 (D. Del. 1958).
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eral regulations prohibit an airline from allowing a passenger to
board its aircraft with a dangerous weapon or explosive device, "
and state courts impose liability upon carriers for failure to protect
their passengers from foreseeable harms."' Since the federal regulations and the common law duty of protection seek to regulate
activity that poses particular danger to the public, the state in
which the pre-flight screening procedures are effectuated has a
clear interest in their reasonable performance. If the protection
afforded the public by the regulation is to be effective, it must be
effective at the source of the danger, e.g., the screening checkpoint. Thus, considering the purpose of the regulations, the state
where the hijacker boards the aircraft has a greater relation to
the occurrence of a hijacking than does a state wherein the actual
injury was sustained by the passenger, despite the latter state's
interest in providing compensation to those injured within its,
boundaries. Accordingly, the law of the state where the aircraft
was boarded by the hijacker should normally govern suits for damages brought by passengers against airlines for injuries suffered
during in-flight hijackings of domestic carriers!" On the other hand,
in the case where the issue of the air carrier's negligence arises
solely out of the actions taken by the carrier's employees during
the course of an in-flight skyjacking, e.g., where the hijacker is
not armed and the air carrier's employees take no action to determine such, an analysis of each state's relation to the occurrence
may lead to a different result and an application of the law of the
state where the injury, if any, occurred.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Warsaw system, with its imposition of absolute liability on
international air carriers for injuries to their passengers, has provided a regime within which passengers who suffer injuries during hijackings of international flights have not infrequently sought
24

14 C.F.R. § 121.538(b) (1980).

2 Letsos v. Chicago Transit Auth., 47 Ill. 2d 437, 441, 265 N.E.2d 650,
653 (1976); see note 84 supra, and accompanying text.
0 Cf. People ex rel Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Gilberto, 74 Ill.
2d
90, 383 N.E.2d 977, 981 (1978) (applicability of the Warsaw Convention "de-

pends upon the place where the 'accident,' rather than the resulting injuries
occurred, and the 'accident' . . . consisted of the hijacking itself.")
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compensatory relief. By contrast, although the majority of hijacking incidents that have involved American air carriers in recent
years have occurred on domestic flights, and even though the airlines are not protected on domestic flights by the limitations on liability applied to international flights, passengers thereon, for whatever reason, have generally not utilized the common law negligence
theory to recover damages for their injuries. This article supports
the position that a passenger on a domestic flight could, in some
circumstances, recover in a negligence action against the airline
for injuries resulting from a skyjacking.
An airline has a duty to exercise a high degree of care to protect
its passengers from the threat of hijackers. This duty would seemingly require the airline to exercise a high degree of care to prevent any passenger from smuggling a weapon or explosive device
aboard its aircraft. While it is unclear as to whether this duty would
be breached in the case where a hijacker takes a weapon onto the
aircraft by circumventing or forcing his way through the airlines
pre-flight screening station, the airline is likely to be found negligent where it fails to detect a weapon or explosive device that is
carried by a hijacker through the airline's screening checkpoint.
If negligence per se is not imposed in the case where a weapon or
explosive device has penetrated the airline's screening system, the
burden should be shifted to the airline to show that it was not
negligent in that it had taken all reasonably practical measures to
prevent such a penetration of its security system. This defense
should succeed only in the case of the hijacker who possesses no
real weapon, and then only if the simulated weapon, if any, is
shown not to be detectable by the airline's exercise of a high degree of care and only if it is further shown that the hijacker was
not subject to detection through utilization of the behavioral profile. In the case of an unarmed hijacker who boards having no
instrument in his possession with which to promote the hoax, a
plaintiff-passenger would be hard-pressed to show that the airline
was negligent in screening the hijacker prior to boarding. However, the carrier's duty to exercise a high degree of care for the
safety of its passengers continues beyond the pre-flight screening
station through the entire flight, and at least in the context of the
unarmed hijacker, the airline should not readily accede to the hi-
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jacker's demands until there is some showing on the part of the
hijacker that he is capable of carrying out the threats he has made.
Nevertheless, in light of the airline's duty to exercise a high degree
of care to provide for the safety of all the passengers on board,
an acquiescence to a hijacker's demands on the part of the air carrier could constitute a breach of duty only when it is clearly shown
that the carrier's employees knew or plainly should have known
that the hijacker was unarmed. Diversion of the aircraft to a
foreign country on demand of the hijacker would seem more consistent with the airline's duty to protect its passengers than would
taking the risk of death or serious injury to its passengers in order
to reach a scheduled destination without delay. Thus, in the context of a hijacking carried out by an unarmed hijacker, a plaintiffpassenger who has nonetheless suffered severe mental distress and
anxiety due to the traumatic hijacking experience in which the
hijacker was perceived to possess the power to cause the deaths of
everyone aboard the aircraft, would not likely be able to prove
negligence on the part of the airline, either in failure to detect a
weapon at the screening checkpoint or in acceding to the demands
of the hijacker who has claimed to possess a bomb. Even if the
problem of the impact rule could be overcome in this case, such
a plaintiff would not be able to recover from the airline for injuries
unless a system that would impose liability without fault were implemented. Those who favor adequate compensation for all injuries might support such a proposal." 1 On the other hand, opponents would consist of those who believe that the function of the
law is "to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable
degree" as opposed to establishing a remedy for every wrong. '
Furthermore, the allocation of the full costs of hijackings and
similar criminal offenses should not be placed upon the airlines
without considering the equities of the burden. "Although protection of the injured passengers is assumed, the requirement that
airlines bear the expense of attacks which they may well be powerless to prevent could actually lead to a reduction of air service or
to an unreasonable drain on the airline's coffers." 33
...
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 8, at 70; Skyjacking, supra note 8, at 44.

" Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363
(1977).
' Comment, Deterring Airport Terrorist Attacks and Compensating the
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The law should at least impose liability in those cases where
the air carrier possesses the power but failed to adequately protect its passengers. Since January, 1973, twelve of the 45 attempted
hijackings aboard U.S. carriers have involved a firearm, knife or
other weapon or explosive material passing undetected through
pre-boarding passenger screening systems that the airlines are
obligated to maintain." ' The airlines may have had the duty and
power to prevent these hijackers from boarding their aircraft while
armed. It is submitted that in most jurisdictions a plaintiffpassenger would be able to recover in a negligence action against
the airline for any resulting physical or mental injuries arising out
of such hijacking cases.

Victim, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1134, 1155 (1977). See Mauer, supra note 30, at 362,
describing the high cost of implementing security measures and the deteriorating
economic position of many airlines.
2 4 See 1979 FAA Report, supra note 11, at 1; see also notes 14, 47 and 48
supra, and accompanying text.

